

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS
BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER (6)	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER (9)
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) THE INFLEXIBLE RESPONSE, United States Army Mobilization Doctrine 1945-1951		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final Report, 24 April 1979
7. AUTHOR(s) Captain John Michael Kendall (10)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) (12) 188
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Student HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAFC-OPP-E) 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS HQDA, MILPERCEN ATTN: DAFC-OPP-E 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332		12. REPORT DATE 24 April 1979
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS (If different from Controlling Office)		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 182
LEVEL II		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclass
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Thesis for MA in Military History at Duke University		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Korean War Mobilization Doctrine National Guard Army Reserve Selective Service Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) By examining the mobilization plans developed before the Korean War and the actual mobilization during the first year of that war, the author answers the question of why the Army mobilized in the manner it did for the war. After World War II the Army assumed unusual missions, the occupation of Europe and Japan and assistance to the fledgling Air Force, which hindered its readiness. While the Army developed traditional mobilization plans in 1946, the creation of the Department of Defense, uncertainty over the army's mission, and austere budgets prevented the development of a reserve		

ADA 079137

UDC FILE COPY

DDC
DEC 31 1979
RECEIVED

391191

over

LB

Block 20 (continued)

force to support these plans. Only a partial mobilization was ordered for the Korean War but this put a strain on army readiness and created inequalities for those recalled. The burden fell on World War II veterans. The mobilization problems received political attention, and Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 to protect reservists. Universal Military Training, the keystone of the mobilization plans, never passed Congress. The author concludes that the political, economic, military, and international environment of the period created an uncertain situation which insured that the Army could not have the large responsive reserve that it had desired. This environment forced the Army into the inefficient mobilization used during the Korean War.

COVER SHEET

2

THE INFLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Captain John Michael Kendall
HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-OPP-E)
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, VA 22332

Final report 24 April 1979

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

A thesis submitted to Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DDC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or special
A	

79 12 27 073

THE INFLEXIBLE RESPONSE

United States Army Mobilization

Doctrine 1945-1951

by

John Michael Kendall

Department of History
Duke University

Date: _____

Approved:

Theodore Ropp, Supervisor

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in the Department
of History in the Graduate
School of Duke University

1979

79 12 27 074

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter	
I. ESTABLISHING THE PRECEDENT: ARMY MANPOWER MOBILIZATIONS PRE-1945	5
II. PREPARING TO FIGHT THE LAST WAR: THE MOBILIZATION PLAN OF 1946	36
III. FISCAL REALITY: THE EIGHTEEN DIVISION PLAN	66
IV. THE QUICK FIX: THE ARMY MOBILIZATION FOR THE KOREAN WAR	110
V. CONCLUSION: AN UNCERTAIN SITUATION	156
SOURCES	163

INTRODUCTION

The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves, which should always be prepared.¹

The mobilization of the United States Army for the Korean War differed greatly from previous twentieth century mobilizations. For the first time the United States did not have the luxury of time provided by allies to mobilize its manpower. During World War II, the American Army did not commence land operations against the Axis Nations for nearly two years. In addition, the Korean mobilization was not total--only one-third of the members of the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps were recalled. This system led to many inequities. Besides the serious political decision of which National Guard divisions to federalize, the Army decided to recall the members of the inactive reserve who had not participated in regular training periods, before active reservists who had volunteered for training and drill pay.

The Army was not prepared to fight a limited war in 1950. The austere years preceding the Korean War had greatly reduce^d its readiness. Another more important factor was

¹Antoine Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1862 (reprint)), p. 44.

the Army mobilization plans developed in the late 1940s. The Army predicated these plans on the assumption that the next war would be total, like World War II. The Army did not envision a limited war in Korea. A critical question is, therefore, why the Army chose to mobilize its reserve components in the manner in which it did during the first year of the Korean War.

An analysis of the pre-Korean War mobilization plans is necessary to understand the Korean mobilization. The post-World War II era is critical because of the impact of the mobilization planning on the forces available at the start of Korea. The mobilization of reserve forces during only the first year of the Korean War will be considered. During the first year most of the reservists were recalled. Moreover, by July 1951 the Army had completed its buildup and was in the process of maintaining the increased strength. In addition, most of the problems associated with the mobilization surfaced by early 1951. Congressional hearings to revise the reserve system and to prevent similar problems were being conducted. The military stalemate in Korea during the summer of 1951 lessened the Far East Command's priority on manpower. The emphasis shifted to a buildup of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe.

Several controversies arose during the Korean conflict. They will not be addressed in this study. The Truman-MacArthur dispute resulted from the limited American commitment to the war and did not itself have a direct effect

on the mobilization policies. Moreover, the tactical and strategic decisions of the war, such as the crossing of the 38th parallel into North Korea and the merits of the surprise landing at Inchon, while interesting, do not have a direct bearing on mobilization policies. These controversies represent part of the overall American military policy and will be presented only as part of that policy.

Mobilization planning is a complex process involving numerous organizations. The Army and its two reserve elements--the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps (now called the Army Reserve)--are totally dependent on congressional appropriations for their functioning. Congress also influences these forces through laws concerning the organization, training, and recruiting for these forces. The Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff are also directly concerned with the status of these forces. The service rivalries during the late 1940s concerning strategic missions affected the Army mobilization plans. These mobilization plans also reflected the foreign and military policy of the United States as determined by the President, State Department, and Defense Department. Finally, the state governments and the lobbying forces of the reserves, the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officer Association, influenced organization and missions of the reserves.

The mobilization planning during the post-World War II era occurred in two phases--the "M-day" plan and the

"Eighteen Division" plan. The first plan was a result of the lessons of World War II. The "Eighteen Division" plan, on the other hand, reflected the austere fiscal situation in the late 1940s and was a more realistic plan.

The mobilization for Korea also occurred in two phases. During the first four months, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deployed most of the available manpower to Korea. The Army stripped the regular and reserve units of individuals to fill the immediate needs of Korea. Later the Army developed a long-range mobilization plan, relying on the Selective Service System to refill the depleted units as well as replace the men returning from Korea. The latter phase was a result of the shift in emphasis by President Truman from Korea to Europe and the attendant need for available, uncommitted units.

The Korean War was the first partial mobilization for the United States Army. It demonstrated that the United States no longer had time to mobilize, equip, and train units after the start of hostilities. The post-Korean War Army would have to have sufficient trained forces-in-being (active units) to meet future threats.

CHAPTER I

ESTABLISHING THE PRECEDENT: ARMY MANPOWER

MOBILIZATIONS PRE-1945

Since colonial times, the elements of military manpower mobilization have been present in the United States. These elements--regular forces, reserve forces, volunteer forces, and a form of compulsory service--existed at the state or federal level. As the American experience progressed from the Revolutionary War into the twentieth century, the use of these elements has been modified to fit the needs of the United States. The mobilization for the Korean War was a result of the various lessons of these earlier experiences.

These experiences have been unique for various reasons. The lack of a strong potential enemy within the Western Hemisphere has been the most critical factor in American mobilization planning. Time has always been available to organize the required military forces to fight European nations. Moreover, the national rivalries of Europe during the first 170 years of the American existence kept the large forces away from the Western Hemisphere. European nations could not afford to become too involved in the Americas without risking their positions in Europe.

Logistical resupply across the Atlantic Ocean was always difficult for European nations. The United States did not engage in an overseas war until 1898, so the ubiquitous American militia provided the time to stop the invading forces.¹ The advantages of geography and time meant that the United States did not perforce need to develop a mobilization doctrine along the same lines as the European nations. The American doctrine suited the unique political and military realities of the United States during the first 170 years of existence.

The pre-Revolutionary Army grew out of the colonial militia. The local militia tradition developed from one element of the British military system--one which went back to the Anglo-Saxon "fyrd" before 1066. These men, normally liable from the ages of sixteen to sixty, had to furnish their own weapons. They served only when a specific situation required their mobilization and were not required to serve outside their district. By the Revolutionary War, all thirteen colonies had adopted this part of the British system.²

¹John Shy in A People Numerous and Armed presents a new perspective on the role of the militia in the Revolutionary War and develops this theme.

²Eilene Galloway, History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces 1775-1957. Prepared for Subcommittee #1, House Armed Services Committee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 442; LTC Marvin A. Kreidberg and 1LT Merton G. Henry, History of Military

To compensate for the shortcomings of the militia system, several colonies had organized "permanent" militia units. This concept was the forerunner of the modern National Guard. Massachusetts organized the first such unit, later designated the 182nd Infantry, in 1636. These units were, however, under the control of the states, not the continental government.¹

The difficulties of organizing a federal government during the Revolutionary War caused difficulties in forming any continental armed services. The continental government had no power to force individual states to supply troops to George Washington's army. While the states supported Washington when he campaigned in their state, they had no desire to send their units out of their colony.

Army recruiters also had difficulties filling the continental army. The federal bounty was considerably less than that offered by the states. While the states offered short-term service, the army recruiters could only offer long enlistments. Eventually the continental government had to accept shorter terms of service as well. Individual states did draft men out of the militia into the organized units. The peak strength of Washington's army was only

Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 3-12.

¹Kreidberg, pp. 3-7.

35,000; yet it required over 500,000 individual enlistments during the eight years of the war to keep it functioning. Clearly, a better system was necessary, though that system would have to reflect the governmental arrangement agreed on after independence.¹

The Constitution has several clauses that pertain to mobilization. The "Army Clause" gave Congress the authority to raise and support armies. Although the Constitution forbade the states to maintain standing military forces during peacetime without the consent of Congress, the "Militia Clause" of the Constitution delineated the conditions under which these forces could be kept. This clause gave Congress the power

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving for the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia,² according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

These rather general clauses, like many others in the Constitution, did not determine the force sizes or mobilization procedures which would flesh out the military policies of a new nation. As with so many other constitutional

¹Kreidberg, p. 17; Galloway, p. 442.

²U.S., Congress, Senate, The Constitution of the United States of America, S. Doc. 170, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1953, pp. 24-28. The Second Amendment also guaranteed the right to bear arms because of the need for a "well regulated Militia" as part of the security of a free state, p. 40.

compromises they papered over controversies which centered for nearly two centuries on the need for a strong militia and the role of the federal government in this militia. After the Revolutionary War, the regular force had been reduced to eighty men to guard stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. The Federalists desired a strong militia, organized by the federal government, to provide for the nation's security. Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War, proposed a plan to accomplish this. The cornerstone of Knox's plan was the periodical training of the militia.--- All men between eighteen and forty-five were to participate in scheduled drills, and the nation was to be organized into geographic areas to facilitate this training. The liability for call to service depended on the person's age.¹

Congress did not pass the plan as outlined. The fundamental issue at this time was not over military effectiveness or security but over the division of powers between the state and the federal government. Control of the Army was a critical power. The states had no desire for the federal government to control the Army as this could lead to further encroachment into other state prerogatives. President Washington was willing to compromise on this issue; the formation of the union was more important than the

¹U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Report The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951 (HR 5426). H. Rept 1066, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1951, p. 3. Hereafter cited as House Report, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951.

structure of the militia force.

Washington accepted the Militia Act of 1792 which was passed as a compromise by Congress. This act did not specify any training requirements for the militia force, but it did specify that all men aged eighteen to forty-five were to be a part of the militia. All men had to provide their own weapons as well. The act required the states to send an annual report to the federal government, but the annual muster day implemented by the states to check the militia roll soon turned into a local celebration rather than a training period. Fortunately, there was no test of this system during this period.¹

Further laws during the early nineteenth century defined the American military policy. The Act of 1795 required the militiamen to serve for only three months during an emergency. By 1803 the President had the authority to accept volunteer units into federal service. These units were usually formed by private individuals or the states. The President could now call up to 80,000 men from either the volunteers or the militia, with the volunteers serving twelve months and the militia the three months. The threats of war at this time with France and Britain prompted these actions by Congress. The acts of the 1790s would be the basis of the mobilization process for the nineteenth century.²

¹Ibid., Galloway, pp. 443-444.

²Kreidberg, pp. 30-38.

The United States was not prepared militarily to fight the War of 1812. Just as predicted, the British were heavily involved in the Napoleonic Wars and could not devote full efforts to the war with the United States. On the eve of the war, the Regular Army had only 20 percent of the authorized 35,000 men. The military was built up from a combination of both volunteers and the militia. Short service again plagued the war effort. Over 500,000 men enlisted in the Army during the war, yet nearly 400,000 of these men enlisted for a period of six months or less. Once again, the vast majority of the Army (460,000) came from the militia.¹

Most of the states relied on their militia units to form volunteer units. In many cases the states had to resort to drafting members of the militia to fill manpower quotas assigned by the War Department. The situation was further aggravated by the refusal of some states to furnish the troops requested by the President. While the Militia Act of 1792 authorized the President to request units, it did not give the federal government the power to require the states to comply. The performance of the militia at the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814 epitomized the difficulties of the militia system. The untrained militia ran when the British first opened fire, and the British Army entered the

¹Ibid., pp. 50-53; Galloway, p. 445.

city of Washington unopposed.¹

The situation changed little during the thirty years between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. The Mexican War was the first time the Army had to fight outside the limits of the United States. This complicated matters further since the militia was designed to stop invasions, not to participate in them. As a result they could not play a major role in the war. The federal government, therefore, resorted to the use of volunteer units. These units, drawn from the states, were usually members of militia units who volunteered for service. They then came under federal, not state control. Of course, these units were largely untrained and poorly equipped.²

The status of the Regular Army had also changed little between 1812 and the start of the Mexican War. General Zachary Taylor, commander of the Regular Army units along the Mexican border, had only 3,860 men in his command in early 1846--over half the Regular Army's available men. Less than 10 percent of the 116,000 men who served in the war were from the militia. Most of these were called at the start of the hostilities by General Taylor. These men were

¹Galloway, pp. 445-446. The Supreme Court in 1827 settled the issue of state compliance to a presidential call for men in the federal government's favor.

²Ibid., p. 446. House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, p. 4.

quickly replaced by volunteers.¹

A congressional act in May 1846 which limited the early volunteer service to twelve months severely hampered military operations. General Winfield Scott had to delay the completion of his march to Mexico City for three months when 40 percent of his army returned home when their enlistments expired. The War Department, in an effort to retain these men, offered a twelve dollar bounty to those who would reenlist for the duration of the war. Because few men took advantage of the offer, Congress changed the law in 1847 and extended enlistments. As a result of this law, regulars had to enlist for five years or the duration of the war. Over 40,000 men joined in spite of this.²

A combination of regulars and volunteers won the Mexican War. The major lessons of the war were the necessity for long-term service for the volunteers and the unreliability of the militia system for foreign wars. The military system did not take steps to correct these weaknesses, and President Lincoln faced the same problems in 1861 at the start of the Civil War.

¹Kreidberg, pp. 64-69. In 1820 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had proposed a new mobilization concept--the expansible army. He envisioned numerous regular units, organized around a nucleus of regular officers and men. In case of war the militia would fill these units. This concept never received a formal test because the army strength was always below the minimum needed for these units.

²Ibid., pp. 77-78; Galloway, pp. 446-447.

The legal structure of the mobilization system had not changed significantly in the seventy years before the Civil War. President Lincoln's first act after the firing on Fort Sumter was to call for 75,000 militiamen from the states. As in the past, these men were still available for only three months. The Regular Army, which consisted of only 16,000 men, did not play a significant role in the war since they were scattered along the frontier. The Regular Army stayed along the frontier during the war.

The militia in 1861 was a large force on paper, but much of it was basically unorganized. It numbered over three million men according to the state reports, but some states had not reported on the status of their militia since 1827. President Lincoln's first call for militiamen resulted in nearly 21,000 more men responding than had been requested. They were unorganized as a federal fighting force, however. One of the original states--Delaware--had no militia law; the unit sent in response to Lincoln's call was raised by private individuals without state aid.¹

Once the militia had returned home, three months after the war had started, most subsequent units raised by the Union consisted of volunteers. By July 1861 Congress authorized the organization of 500,000 volunteers for enlistments of six months to three years. Initially, most of these volunteers came from militia units that volunteered

¹Kreidberg, pp. 90-92.

as a unit. Since the states had organized these units, the federal government had to accept them as organized. The states continued to appoint the officers, many for political reasons. The mobilization process worked well initially, when the war was popular in the North. But the requirement for the federal government to work through the states to organize manpower still hampered mobilization efforts.¹

As the war progressed and the Union suffered defeats, the mobilization process became more difficult. A call for 300,000 men in August 1862 produced only 87,000. The draft law of March 1863 helped solve these problems. The law had many deficiencies: it was operated by federal army officers working in the local community without local assistance; the law permitted substitutions and paid commutations for \$300; the individual had no civic responsibility to register or appear for induction; and the draft officers had the responsibility to apprehend deserters. The law did signal a fundamental change in the mobilization process; it allowed the federal government to bypass the states to procure the needed men.² More importantly, no state challenged the change in the system.

¹Ibid., p. 93.

²Kreidberg, pp. 105-108; Galloway, pp. 449-450. The South also employed the draft to mobilize manpower; they started drafting men one year before the North. The South also had difficulty in implementing the draft at the local level.

The new draft law raised only 162,000 men, a small part of the 2.7 million men provided by the states during the war. The law did spur volunteering on the part of reluctant individuals. The presidential call in March 1864 raised 100,000 more men than requested. At the same time, the exemptions for potential draftees were tightened and commutations were severely restricted. The North also started enlisting blacks in late 1862; by the end of the war over 185,000 men had participated.¹

When the war first started, President Lincoln permitted individuals to organize independent units. This soon complicated matters because of the difficulty of crediting the men to individual state quotas. The President quickly ended this practice by requiring all new units to be organized at the state level. The draft and state volunteer quotas, in spite of their imperfections, kept units at effective strength.²

The War Department did not have mobilization plans at the start of the war and did not formulate them after the war ended. At the conclusion of the war volunteers from state quotas made up 95 percent of the Army's strength.³ The multitude of enlistment service lengths

¹Kreidberg, pp. 94-96, 111-115.

²Ibid., pp. 99-102.

³Ibid., p. 95. At the end of the war, 950,000 of the 980,000 men serving in the Army were volunteers.

available made manpower planning difficult and recruiting nearly impossible. The report by Brigadier General James Oakes, written at the end of the war concerning problems on operating the draft in Illinois, would, however, be an asset later on. His enumeration of the difficulties and recommendations for improvements would later serve as the basis for the Selective Service Act passed during World War I, the system that has been used since that time.¹

Several changes between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War served to improve the nation's mobilization potential. The land-grant college system provided by the Morrill Act of 1862 prompted most states to have military science courses in their state colleges. By the 1890s the federal government was providing aid to these programs which were the forerunners of the Reserve Officers Training Course (ROTC). The framework of the modern National Guard organization also began to emerge during the 1870s as the states began to rely more on organized units to handle labor problems, the first real local function of the militia since frontier days. Many states fined those not participating in militia drills in order to pay for the organized units. The role of the federal government in the organization of these units was minimal.²

¹Galloway, pp. 450-451.

²Ibid., p. 452. House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, pp. 4-5.

To improve the position of the National Guard in the national defense structure, several guardsmen formed the National Guard Association (NGA) in 1879. The intended purpose of the NGA was to gain federal aid for the Guard as well as to insure the continuation of their unique status as a state and federal force. While the Association did not achieve their goal in the first twenty years of its existence, it was to play an increasingly important role in the mobilization process during the twentieth century.¹

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was so brief--four months--that a long term mobilization policy was not possible. The Army mobilized state volunteers and units raised by private individuals and did not use the draft. The Regular Army of 21,000 men was scattered across the country, and it had not conducted large unit maneuvers since the Civil War. The regular force was soon doubled by recruiting. This placed the Regular Army in direct competition with the volunteer units. The Regular Army rejected many recruits because they failed to meet their standards. These same men could then join the volunteers because of their lower standards. By the end of the war, volunteer units made up 80 percent of the force raised.²

The National Guard had been organized in all the states

¹Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 16-23.

²Kreidberg, pp. 154-155.

To improve the position of the National Guard in the national defense structure, several guardsmen formed the National Guard Association (NGA) in 1879. The intended purpose of the NGA was to gain federal aid for the Guard as well as to insure the continuation of their unique status as a state and federal force. While the Association did not achieve their goal in the first twenty years of its existence, it was to play an increasingly important role in the mobilization process during the twentieth century.¹

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was so brief--four months--that a long term mobilization policy was not possible. The Army mobilized state volunteers and units raised by private individuals and did not use the draft. The Regular Army of 21,000 men was scattered across the country, and it had not conducted large unit maneuvers since the Civil War. The regular force was soon doubled by recruiting. This placed the Regular Army in direct competition with the volunteer units. The Regular Army rejected many recruits because they failed to meet their standards. These same men could then join the volunteers because of their lower standards. By the end of the war, volunteer units made up 80 percent of the force raised.²

The National Guard had been organized in all the states

¹Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 16-23.

²Kreidberg, pp. 154-155.

by the 1890s, but there was no standard of training, organizing, or equipping the force. Although the Guard numbered over 115,000 men on paper, the War Department felt that the Guard would take as long to train as new units. Because of its constitutional relation to the militia, the Guard could not be used outside the United States as well. Many units did volunteer as a unit to fill the state quota. In this manner they could bypass the restriction on service outside the nation.¹

Congress, in April 1898, authorized President McKinley to form federal volunteer units. This force consisted of engineers, cavalry, and immunes (those immune to the tropical diseases such as yellow fever). While the volunteers numbered only 16,000 out of the 281,000 men used during the war, it included the famous cavalry units of Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood.²

But manpower was not the War Department's major problem; transportation of the units, equipping the units, and sanitation in the camps were the difficulties. Because of the short duration of the war, most units formed never participated in action; those that did were poorly trained and equipped. Fortunately, this war against a weaker power consisted mainly of naval actions.³

¹Ibid., All volunteers had to serve for two years or the duration of the war.

²Ibid., pp. 163-164.

³Ibid., pp. 166-172.

The mobilization difficulties experienced during the Spanish-American War resulted in the first change in the mobilization doctrine of the United States since the Militia Act of 1792. This was part of the Army reforms by Secretary of War Elihu Root. The Dick Act of 1903 was the instrument for the major mobilization doctrine change.¹

The Dick Act was the beginning of the modern state-federal National Guard. The act divided the militia into two separate groups--the reserve militia and the organized militia or National Guard. The reserve militia consisted of all men from eighteen to forty-five years of age who were not members of the National Guard. It was simply a manpower pool and no training was required of this force.²

The National Guard, on the other hand, came under federal scrutiny for the first time. The intent of the act was to bring the National Guard up to the proficiency level of the Regular Army within five years. The federal government provided money and equipment to the Guard in exchange for the right to inspect the training of the force. The Army was to provide Regular Army instructors for those units that requested them. Regular drills and maneuvers (a five-day summer camp and twenty-four weekly two-hour periods) were required. In addition, the Guard units were to be

¹The Dick Act was named for the sponsor of the bill, Congressman George F. Dick of Ohio. Dick was a National Guard Major General and a past president of the National Guard Association.

²Galloway, pp. 454-455.

organized along the same lines as the regular forces.¹ The Dick Act also gave the President the authority to call the Guard into service for nine months whenever the security of the nation was threatened.

An amendment to the Dick Act was necessary in 1908. The President was no longer limited to the nine-month call; he could specify the term of federal service as long as individual members were released whenever their normal enlistment ended. Moreover, the amendment required that the National Guard be the first reserve unit recalled by the President; the volunteer force had to be second. The President could also use the Guard outside the United States if he so desired. This caused a constitutional problem because of the language of the Militia Clause, and in 1912, Attorney General Wickersham ruled that this part of the act was unconstitutional. The status of the Guard remained somewhat ambiguous for several years after his ruling.²

In 1908, the mobilization process underwent two other changes. The War Department formed the Militia Division. This division was designed to deal with the problems of the militia forces and was the precursor of the National Guard Bureau. In addition, Congress authorized the formation of the Medical Reserve Corps. This was a federal

¹Ibid., p. 454; William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 70.

²Galloway, pp. 454-455; House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, pp. 6-7.

unorganized militia into a Militia of the United States. The National Guard was expanded from 100,000 to 400,000 men and the number of drills increased to 48 with a summer camp. In addition, for the first time the members of the Guard received federal pay for the drills they performed. Regular Army instructors were also authorized in all Guard units, and the Secretary of War was permitted to cut off federal aid to those states that did not comply with federal standards. The act gave the Guard a definite role in the national defense structure. The Guard could now be deployed overseas as a result of the act and all members were required to take a federal oath. Moreover, officers had to be "federally recognized" by passing an examination, even though they were still nominated by the states.¹

The Act of 1916 also organized Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps as the components of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). These units contained men discharged from the Regular Army and composed a pool of trained federal reserves. The members of the Medical Reserve Corps were integrated into the Organized Reserve Corps.²

Two weeks after the Act of 1916 passed Congress, President Wilson called the National Guard into federal

¹Kreidberg, pp. 190-196; Galloway, p. 456.

²Galloway, pp. 456-457; House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, pp. 6-7.

service and deployed it along the Mexican border because of the troubles with Pancho Villa. Wilson called the Guard under the authority of the Dick Act, not the recent National Defense Act. For this reason, the Guard was not used in Mexico. While the mobilization demonstrated the inefficiency of the Guard, it did purge the organization of many ineffective members. The continued poor staff planning for mobilization of the War Department was also apparent. The mobilization forced the Guard to organize itself into divisional units; this was an advantage in preparing for World War I. The Guard had not completed demobilization when Wilson recalled it for service in Europe.¹

World War I signaled a new concept in mobilization doctrine; states no longer had a role in the mobilization process. This time President Wilson called the National Guard under the provisions of the 1916 Act and federalized the entire 180,000 man force. Once federalized, however, units were broken up as needed by the War Department--a change which caused much bitterness on the part of many guardsmen.²

The Selective Service Act of May 1917 provided the primary mobilization machinery for the war. The War Department incorporated the recommendations of General Oakes

¹Kreidberg, pp. 196-200; Galloway, pp. 456-457.

²Kreidberg, pp. 222-224; House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, p. 8.

on the Civil War draft into the Act. Local citizens conducted the selection process in communities. Moreover, it was the civic responsibility of each individual to report for registration and induction. Bounties or substitutions were not permitted. The War Department assigned state quotas on the basis of the number of available qualified men, not total state population as in the Civil War. More than 24 million men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five registered, and 2.8 million were actually inducted for service.¹

The Selective Service Act also authorized the President to accept volunteer divisions raised by private individuals. Theodore Roosevelt immediately offered to raise two, but Wilson turned him down and never exercised this authority. The Army did accept, however, voluntary enlistments by individuals; nearly 900,000 men joined the Army. Voluntary enlistments were not the primary means of mobilizing men. In fact, enlistments were not permitted for those who had registered for the draft.²

Wilson also recalled the federal reserve forces as part of the mobilization for World War I. This group did not contain large numbers of men because of the short time they had been in existence and the lack of emphasis the

¹Galloway, p. 458; Kreidberg, pp. 244-250.

²Kreidberg, pp. 249-252.

War Department had placed on their organization.¹

This mobilization clearly demonstrated that the expansible army concept would not work in an Army of over four million. The War Department plan to organize all the units around a nucleus of regular officers and enlisted men had to be abandoned as there were simply not enough men available. By July 1917 the War Department had decided to send one regular division to France as a symbol of the American commitment to the war (this was the only available regular division) and use the remaining regulars to train the Guard and other divisions. By the end of the war, a little over a year later, the Army had organized sixty-two divisions with forty-three of these serving in France.²

The end of the war brought calls for additional legislation to reform the mobilization process. As in the past, the lack of an immediate threat to the nation's security made the acceptance of the plan of Generals John J. Pershing, the American Commander in France, and John McA. Palmer, who developed legislation for the plan, difficult. Their plan was based on a small Regular Army with a strong National Guard as back up. The keystone of this plan was a form of Universal Military Training (UMT). UMT would require

¹Ibid., pp. 222-227. The Officers Reserve Corps provided approximately 8,000 officers in 1917; the Enlisted Reserve Corps mobilized 3,000 men in June 1917; and the Regular Army Reserve, which had only 16 members in 1916, supplied over 8,300 men for the war.

²Kreidberg, pp. 294-308.

all young men of the nation to undergo minimum military training. They would be available for service in a minimum amount of time. Reserve divisions, the third line of defense after the Regular Army and Guard, would be at cadre strength and available to be filled by trained UMT graduates if the need arose. The reserve division would provide the mobilization base to expand the Army to its full potential if the nation were threatened. It was an ambitious plan but politically unfeasible in 1919.¹

In 1920, Congress amended the National Defense Act of 1916. The Army was to be made up of three components--the Regulars, the National Guard (while in federal service) and the Organized Reserves. The amendment authorized an increase in the Regular Army's strength to 280,000. The Army was to be divided into nine corps areas, each with a regular division as well as two guard and three reserve divisions. In case of an emergency, the guard divisions would be ready immediately and the reserve divisions would be filled by inductees. It was envisioned that 400,000 men would be available on the day mobilization started (M-day) and three times that number four months later.²

¹Ibid., p. 378. The idea for UMT originated with the Knox plan in 1792. Part of the trouble the War Department had with Congress was the lack of agreement among the army leaders. Secretary of War Newton Baker and Chief of Staff General Peyton March argued before Congress for a plan different from Pershing's.

²Ibid., pp. 401-403.

As part of the 1920 amendment, the National Guard was to be increased to 435,000 men by 1924. The Guard was still to be the first reserve unit called to active service. Because of the 1920 Amendment, the Guard gained representation in the War Department through the establishment of a committee known as the Section Five Committee. The committee was composed of equal representation of the Guard and the Regular Army and was responsible to review matters of concern to the Guard. The Amendment also required that the head of the Militia Bureau be a National Guard officer.¹

The Amendment provided for an ORC composed of the Officers and Enlisted Reserve Corps. The Officers Reserve Corps was initially filled by veterans of the war, but as time passed it was filled by graduates of the ROTC program. The members of the officers corps were required to remain proficient by completing required correspondence course work during each five-year training period. The War Department neglected the Enlisted Reserve Corps during the interwar period. It normally had 3,000 members during this time, most of whom were in the process of completing requirements for a reserve commission.²

¹Galloway, p. 459.

²Ibid. Several veterans groups formed during the 1920s, including the Reserve Officers Association. Although it did not have the power of the National Guard Association, it would play a significant role in the mobilization policies after World War II. In addition, the Organized Reserve

The plans of the War Department did not work out as intended. The Regular Army did not grow above 50 percent of its authorized strength until the late 1930s. Similarly, the National Guard did not approach the 50 percent mark. There was not an immediate threat in the 1920s and the depression prevented increased appropriations for defense in the early 1930s. The system envisioned in 1920 could not work effectively at reduced strengths. The officers of the Officers Reserve Corps were, however, utilized during the depression to operate the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camps for the federal government.¹

Congress changed the status of the National Guard in an amendment to the 1916 Act in 1933. The Guard assumed a dual role as both a state force and a federal reserve force. This change permitted the President to recall the Guard as part of his authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. This totally eliminated the states from the mobilization picture. The Guard's first mission was as a federal force (under the Army Clause), not as a state force, even though it was under state control (part of Militia Clause) during peacetime. This change required the War Department to preserve the integrity of guard units if

Corps gained a representative on the War Department Staff in 1927, the Executive for Reserve Affairs.

¹Kreidberg, pp. 378-379; COL. Arthur Roth, "Development of the Army Reserve Forces," Military Affairs, Spring 1953, p. 5.

possible.¹

The mobilization for World War II began before the United States entered the war. The size of the regular and reserve forces increased steadily, starting in 1935. By the start of the war in Europe, however, neither force was at its full strength. President Roosevelt called the National Guard into federal service in September 1940. In August, Congress, in a joint resolution, gave him the authority to call the Guard for one year of training. The federalization took nine months to complete; the limiting factor was the availability of camps and supplies for the entire force. By June 1941 eighteen infantry divisions, nearly 300,000 officers and men, had been inducted into the federal service. Even though the Guard was federalized at its greatest strength ever, many Guard divisions had to be filled with inductees provided by the Selective Service System. In many cases the inductees accounted for 50 percent of the authorized strength of the units. In addition, many divisions had to be filled with officers from the Officers Reserve Corps.²

¹Riker, p. 86; Galloway, pp. 459-460; House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, pp. 8-9.

²Kreidberg, pp. 554-555. General of the Army George C. Marshall, The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1947), pp. 18-24, 49-51; COL. Elbridge Colby, "What of the National Guard," Infantry Journal, February 1947, p. 11. After the invasion of Poland by Germany President Roosevelt had authorized an increase

The Officers Reserve Corps, numbering 120,000 in 1940, filled the Regular Army's need for additional officers during the expansion. By June 1941, 55 percent of the Officers on active duty were from the Officers Reserve Corps. The President had the authority from the Congressional Joint Resolution to recall officers involuntarily. The balance of the reserve officers were on active duty soon after the war started. This group supplied desperately needed officers early in the war. The Enlisted Reserve Corps, numbering only 3,000 men, did not constitute a significant reserve force for the expansion of the army.¹

The primary mobilization mechanism during the war was the selective service. The Selective Service and Training Act, passed by Congress in September 1940, was the idea of a private group--The Executive Committee of Military Training Camps. This was the first peacetime selective service in American history. The inductees were to be on active duty for only twelve months of training. After this they had a ten-year obligation in the reserves. According to the law, they could not be sent overseas.²

in the training of the National Guard to sixty two-hour drills and a twenty-one-day summer camp.

¹Marshall, p. 24; Galloway, p. 463. The Regular Army Reserve had been formed in 1937. The force was composed of discharge enlisted men who received a monthly stipend for remaining in the reserve. This force competed directly with the Enlisted Reserve Corps members who were not paid for their services. Of the 28,000 men in the Regular Army Reserve in 1941, only 12,000 were called for duty by the President. The others were deferred for various reasons.

²Galloway, p. 461.

The Act contained a statement of principles concerning the National Guard. This statement reflected the Guard's fear that it would be used only as a home defense force during the war. The statement reaffirmed the congressional intent that the Guard was the first reserve force in the nation and as such, had to be maintained at all times. The statement was the work of the National Guard Association and its primary legislative lobbyist, Major General Milton Reckord.¹

Selective Service provided the armed forces with over ten million men during the war, while nearly fifty million men registered for the draft. The system used was similar to that used in World War I.² Over 600,000 men had been inducted by August 1941 when the one-year limit on the Act was to expire. By a one-vote margin, Congress extended it. The Army was at 1.5 million men when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The Army's strength peaked during the war at over 8 million men. Because of the number of men involved in the armed forces and the need for equal distribution of quality as well as quantity of manpower, the draft became the primary method of supplying manpower in 1942. This

¹Derthick, pp. 58, 76-77, 93-95; Kreidberg, p. 577. Reckord had been a member of the National Guard since 1901. He had been involved in the formulation of the National Defense Act of 1920 and had written the amendment of 1933. He was a member of the first Section Five Committee in 1920. Except for a short break during World War II, he served as the Adjutant General of Maryland from 1919 to 1963.

²Galloway, pp. 460-461.

insured that each service received a fair share of the men. Once the United States entered the war, all members of the armed forces, regardless of component, were to serve for the duration of the war plus six months. This eliminated the short service problems of earlier experiences.¹

The mobilization plans formulated during the 1930s provided a good departure point for the War Department. The American foreign policy of hemispheric defense limited the planning process, although the plans went beyond this policy. There had also been unofficial plans coordinated between the United States and Great Britain before the American entry into the war. The time provided by our allies and the protection of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans gave the United States two years to train and plan for offensive ground operations against the Axis powers.²

The American mobilization doctrine changed after 1900. Before that date the American military had been concerned with wars in or near the United States. Manpower had been mobilized from the state militia. This, while a cumbersome process, had been successful. Constitutional considerations had played a critical role in this doctrine; the states did not desire the federal government to gain too

¹Kreidberg, p. 593. There still was limited recruiting, but these men counted against the quota of the service they joined.

²Galloway, p. 461; Kreidberg, p. 596.

much power. State control of the militia was a means of checking the federal government's power.

During this era the Regular Army was small, although its size increased after each war. The Regular Army's role in warfare was not crucial. The militia was the primary force mobilized. Short service made manpower planning difficult. The War Department did not have a specific planning division for mobilization until the Root reforms at the turn of the century. The pre-1900 mobilization process had been suited specifically to the American needs.

World War I signaled a new era for the mobilization process; manpower mobilized at the federal level only. Local boards made selection decisions; the military played a minor role in this process. At the same time, the growth of the National Guard and the accompanying legislation concerning the Guard provided a better organization of the primary reserve force. The federal government funded the Guard in return for the right to require specific training standards of the Guard. The militia faded from the scene.

The same legislation provided for the establishment of a federal reserve--the Organized Reserve Corps. While the organized reserves did not develop into the large manpower pool expected, it did provide trained officers when the need arose at the start of World War II. The ROTC program kept the pool resupplied prior to World War II.

The United States had two military advantages before 1945--time and geographic position. Time had always been

available to mobilize the needed forces; the nation had no immediate threat to its borders because of the protection of the oceans. General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff during World War II, felt the nation could have been totally prepared for World War II. According to Marshall, the failure to enact UMT after World War I had insured that the nation was not ready when it needed to be. He knew that the plans for the postwar Army had to be formulated before the war ended if they were to have any chance of Congressional passage. Marshall, therefore, started planning for the postwar Army in 1942, before the United States had started offensive operations against the Axis. In addition, he recalled his long-time friend General John McA. Palmer to active duty to help develop these plans. Palmer would develop the foundation for the postwar Army before the war ended.¹

¹Palmer, a West Point graduate, had known Marshall since they were stationed at the Command and General Staff College together. Palmer had worked with Secretary of War Stimson on his plan for the reorganization of the army in 1912. He had been a brigade commander during World War I; General Reckord had been one of his battalion commanders. General Pershing had sent Palmer home immediately after the war to help formulate the postwar plans. Palmer later helped Senator Wadsworth write the National Defense Act of 1920. He retired shortly thereafter because of poor health. During the interwar years he wrote several books on the history of American military policy.

CHAPTER II

PREPARING TO FIGHT THE LAST WAR:

THE MOBILIZATION PLAN OF 1946

Brigadier General John McA. Palmer arrived for duty at the War Department in 1941 with his mind already made up about the postwar needs of the Army. In his book, America in Arms, he had noted, "After the present emergency the American people will be too wise to reject Washington's legacy of military wisdom . . . no nation is fully prepared for war unless its plans include arrangements for the mobilization of its whole manpower if necessary."¹ To Palmer UMT and a large reserve force were the key to any mobilization plan.

The War Department created the Special Planning Division in 1943 to develop plans for the postwar demobilization and restructuring of the Army. Brigadier General William F. Tompkins headed the new staff agency.² Initially, Tompkins and Palmer put together a draft proposal calling for one federal reserve force. The National Guard was to be relegated to only a state role. The National Guard

¹John McA. Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 201-203.

²Tompkins was a 1915 graduate of the Military Academy, finishing in the top 10 percent of his class. He had served in both the Punitive Expedition in Mexico and World War I. Two of his sons were killed in World War II.

Association was not involved in the formulation of this plan and caused the end of the plan by the threat of congressional hearings when they heard of it. Palmer and Tompkins quickly realized that they would have to develop a plan that the National Guard Association and, in particular, the President of the Association, Major General Ellard Walsh, would approve.¹

The National Guard would not willingly participate in its own demise. The Guard was already upset over the transfer in 1942 of the National Guard Bureau from its former position on the War Department Staff, to the Army Service Command. Moreover, the Section Five Committee required by the 1916 National Defense Act to approve all reserve policies, had fallen into disuse the same year. The Guard viewed these actions as illegal and demanded to have a voice in postwar planning. The leaders of the NGA approached General Palmer on these issues and won his support. In early 1944, the War Department added guardsmen to the special planning division to help plan the postwar Army.²

¹Walsh had been a guardsman since 1905 and had served in World War I. He had been the Adjutant General of Minnesota since 1927 and was President of the NGA during the 1920s. Walsh had been the Commanding General of the 34th Infantry Division of the National Guard when it was federalized in 1940, but had been retired by the War Department shortly thereafter because of a stomach ailment. He immediately resumed his duties as Adjutant General of Minnesota and again became President of the NGA. Derthick, pp. 75-76.

²Ibid., pp. 60-63; Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense 1941-45 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 36-43.

Palmer and Tompkins prepared another draft of the postwar policy in April 1944. In this draft, Palmer envisioned the establishment of a force capable of rapid mobilization with the cornerstone being UMT. To streamline the reserves, Palmer wanted to federalize the National Guard and organize a separate state guard to handle local disasters. The plan was based on the development of the most efficient and economical force possible as opposed to a program to support the postwar national strategy, which had not yet been developed. The NGA again refused to support the War Department plan.¹

In exchange for its support of UMT, the National Guard Association wanted a significant role in the postwar defense team. The NGA had many ex-members in Congress and was not afraid to use their influence. Generals Marshall and Palmer, remembering the difficulties in gaining congressional approval for defense plans in 1920, had no desire to engage in a heated congressional debate over defense policy again. Palmer's attempt to get UMT approved by Congress before the war ended was not successful. This was due in part to the lack of a comprehensive postwar military policy to present to Congress. Prosecution of the war, not plans for the postwar era, was the War Department's priority. In addition, Congress noted the lack of a potential enemy after the war ended.²

¹Sherry, pp. 37-43.

²Derthick, pp. 62-65; Sherry, pp. 56-69.

General Palmer, meanwhile, developed the principles of the postwar Army. Marshall approved these concepts, and they were published as War Department Circular 347 on 25 August 1944. This Circular was the basis for all postwar planning. It contained several key assumptions, mainly that UMT would eventually pass Congress and that the UMT graduates would be required to serve time in the reserves after the completion of their training. In addition, the Circular assumed that the United States would have to maintain a military force after the war for occupation of the Axis nations as well as contribute to the international police efforts of the United Nations.¹

Palmer rejected the large-standing army so characteristic of the Germans and Japanese. The future Army would only have a regular force large enough for the peacetime needs of the nation. The core of the wartime Army would be the organized reserves. These reserves, to be effective, would be maintained at a high state of readiness by continual short service with the active forces. The advantages of the system, as enumerated by Palmer, reflected American traditional fears of a militaristic army such as the Axis powers employed during World War II. The new Army would have its leadership spread throughout the population instead of concentrated in a small professional officer elite. Palmer

¹Russell F. Weigley, ed., The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p. 56.

cited the national tradition of reliance on the reserves in emergencies and noted that his plan simply made a permanent institution out of the traditional wartime arrangement.¹ The NGA quickly endorsed Circular 347 since it gave the Guard a significant role in the postwar Army.

Circular 347 established the principles of the postwar Army, but did not delineate the structure of the Army. Section Five Committees were organized to develop the details of the new Army. Initially, there were two committees--one for the National Guard and one for the Organized Reserve Corps--each with equal representation by regulars as well as reservists. Once these two committees completed their preliminary plans in the summer of 1945, they were merged into a single committee with five representatives from the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves. Marshall named General Milton Reckord as the chairman of this committee.²

In October 1945, Reckord's committee published its plan concerning the postwar reserves, called the "Approved

¹Ibid., pp. 57-58. While the basic system of the Germans and the United States did not differ, the active duty requirements did differ. The Germans required universal military service in their Regular Army which the United States did not.

²Reckord had been the Commander of the 29th Infantry Division when it was federalized. He had been relieved shortly thereafter because of his age (62) and was given command of one of the service commands in the United States. Later, he served in Europe as the Provost Marshal for General Eisenhower. He returned from this position to head the postwar organization committee. Derthick, p. 76.

Policies." This plan contained several fundamental concepts. Reckord assumed that UMT would soon be passed and envisioned the need for an Army of 4.5 million men within one year of mobilization day (M-day). This force would be divided among the three components of the Army with the Regular Army being as small as possible.¹

In Reckord's policies the mission of the new Guard was explicit:

1. Mission of the National Guard of the United States--To provide a Reserve component of the Army of the United States, capable of immediate expansion to war strength, able to furnish units for service anywhere in the world, trained, and equipped--
 - a. To defend critical areas of the United States against land, seaborne, or airborne invasion;
 - b. To assist in covering the mobilization and concentration of the remainder of the Reserve Forces;
 - c. To participate by units in all types of operations, including the offensive, either in the United States or overseas.
2. Mission of the National Guard of the several States--To provide sufficient organizations in each state so trained and equipped as to enable them to function efficiently at existing strength in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety, under competent orders of the state authorities.²

The National Guard was to remain as the first reserve force.

The policies set a goal of 425,000 men organized in the Guard within two years but permitted states to recruit the

¹National Guard Association of the United States, The Nation's National Guard (Washington: National Guard Association of the United States, 1954), pp. 45-47. Hereafter cited as NGAUS.

²U.S., War Department, Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau Fiscal Year 1946, p. 312. Hereafter cited as NGB (Year).

maximum that they could maintain at a satisfactory level of training in units. The initial organization of the Guard was to be different from the one used after World War I. Then the War Department had required that all the lower echelon units be organized before the higher headquarters could be established. In 1945 the Guard was to organize units at all levels simultaneously.¹

Reckord also adjusted the responsibilities of the state and federal government for Guard units. The states were still responsible for supplying personnel, armories, and storage areas. The federal government in addition to supplying the uniforms, equipment, ammunition, instructors, and outdoor training areas, had to help pay for the additional armories. Reckord felt these changes were necessary because the planned Guard was to be three times larger than the prewar Guard and in excess of the peacetime needs of the states for disaster assistance. The federal government, Reckord believed, should assist in the cost of housing the additional units.²

The "Approved Policies" also outlined the future role of the Organized Reserves. The ORC was to contain organized units for the first time. Some new units were to be at cadre strength and filled by UMT graduates when needed. These units would provide for the long-term manpower

¹Ibid., pp. 312-314.

²Ibid., p. 321; NGAUS, pp. 67-69.

mobilization of the Army; they would be called and used after the Regular and National Guard units were mobilized. The ORC retained its prewar mission of providing a pool of available trained officers and men. This pool of trained individuals would be used to fill the immediate needs of the Regular and Guard units during mobilization as well as to replace initial losses because of casualties. While the new policies expanded the function of the ORC, it was still the second reserve force.¹

While the War Department established principles and initial policies for the reserve components in 1945, the postwar structure of the Regular Army was not agreed upon until the following year. General Tompkins had attempted several times to gain concurrence of a postwar structure during the war. He could not, however, obtain the agreement of the three major army components (army ground forces, army air corps, and army service command) to his plans. Moreover, the growth of the Army Air Force added a new twist to the planning; the Air Force expected to become independent after the war. The Air Force was, therefore, unwilling to accept any position in the Army structure that did not facilitate its later organization as an independent

¹U.S., War Department, The Organized Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, Army Talk #158, p. 10. Hereafter cited as ORC, Army Talk #158.

service.¹

In March 1943, Tompkins proposed his first plan which envisioned a 1.5 million man Regular Army. General Marshall balked at this large regular force since it also included a provision for UMT and would probably cost \$6-8 billion--three times the prewar budget of the Army. Marshall reminded his staff that the budgets after the conflict would not be unlimited as they had been during the war. Tompkins revised this plan based on Marshall's two principal variables of cost and projected number of volunteers and submitted a revised plan to Palmer and Marshall in February 1945. Tompkins now proposed a regular force of 330,000 men with 630,000 additional UMT trainees per year. While Marshall approved this plan, the Air Force refused to consider it because it would allow for only sixteen air groups. Postwar planning remained at this impasse until after the end of World War II.²

Although the final plan for the Army had not been approved when General Marshall retired as Chief of Staff, he again explained his sentiments in his final report, released 1 September 1945. Marshall stated that the Army

¹The Air Force decided that seventy air groups was the minimum number needed to provide for the security of the nation; this would leave little room for the Army in the small postwar force. The Navy, meanwhile, had also decided on a minimum number--660,000 men--but had presented this plan to Congress before the war ended. Sherry, pp. 196-222.

²Sherry, pp. 35-36, 52, 103-112.

required four million men within one year of mobilization. The new Army, Marshall reiterated, must be based on UMT; he noted that, "Only by universal military training can full vigor and life be instilled into the Reserve System."¹

The National Guard had to be available for deployment within the first few weeks of a future war and did not have the luxury of training time after mobilization. This system would be within the financial means of the country and would be a deterrent against future aggressors. Marshall also realized that the Army had several missions to accomplish immediately after the war: reorganization, occupation of the Axis nations, and demobilization.²

The postwar plans of the War Department changed when General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower became the Chief of Staff in November 1945. Eisenhower questioned reliance solely on UMT and felt that the War Department's assumption that the nation would have a one-year warning before mobilization was unrealistic. He also felt that UMT graduates would require some formal retraining when they were recalled and, therefore, would not be immediately available for deployment. He approved the Air Force's concept of seventy air groups and directed Tompkins to concentrate on forces-in-being (active duty units) rather

¹Marshall, p. 296.

²Ibid., pp. 288-296.

than reserve forces.¹

The final Army mobilization plan envisioned a Regular Army of 1.07 million men with a reserve capable of expanding this force to 4.5 million within 12 months. While the total manpower needed for mobilization had not changed significantly since the first plan in 1943, the distributions between the components had changed. The total number of men from all three components ready for deployment without further training on M-day would be 1.75 million. The Regular Army would have 10 divisions and 70 air groups for a total of 875,000 men. The remainder of the strength would be those on occupational duty. The War Department established the goal of reaching this strength by July 1947. The Air Force would account for 400,000 of these men, leaving a ground force general reserve in the United States of only 30,000 men (2 divisions). The rest had to be made up by the reserves.²

The National Guard was to have a larger role in this mobilization plan than in any previous plan. It was to organize twenty-seven divisions and twenty-one regimental combat teams (RCT). It would also contain twenty-seven air

¹Sherry, pp. 227-229.

²Postwar Military Establishment, "Army Information Digest, February 1947, pp. 15-19; Maj. John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-210 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 261; U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee #2, Universal Military Training. H. R. 4121, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, p. 4487. Hereafter cited as UMT Hearings, 1947.

groups. The total strength would be 680,000 men. According to the plan, all units of the National Guard were to be available on M-day.¹

The Organized Reserve Corps was to provide the balance of the men needed for M-day. It would have 876,000 men in organized units. These units would be of three classifications--A, B, and C. Class A units, numbering 195,000 men, would be available on M-day for deployment while the other classes would be mobilized during the first year after M-day. The ORC would contain twenty-five divisions and thirty-eight air groups. The class A units, together with the National Guard and the Regular Army would compose the 1.75 million men needed on M-day. The balance of the 4.5 million men would come from the remainder of the ORC (both units and the pool of 500,000 individuals), UMT graduates, or the selective service, if needed. The Army would have numerous problems organizing this massive group of men into an effective force.²

The National Guard was a nonexistent force at the end of World War II. All Guard enlistments had expired by the end of the war. The Army released the Guard after the war as individuals, not as units; the units were deactivated as part of the demobilization of the Army. By July 1946 all

¹"Postwar Military Establishment," Army Information Digest, February 1947, pp. 17-19.

²Ibid.; UMT Hearings, 1947, p. 4471

the guard divisions had been deactivated. The Army gave the states the unit colors and designations, but the states had to reorganize the units completely.¹

The National Guard Bureau established a priority system for the reorganization of the new Guard. The twenty-seven divisions were to have top priority followed by the regimental combat teams. Next anti-aircraft units, designed to protect the industrial centers of the United States, were to be organized. Once these objectives had been reached, units directly supporting the divisions and all other units were to be developed. The Guard was to have two armored divisions in its organization for the first time as well.²

Funding would prove to be a major constraint on the new Guard. Equipment for the total force would cost approximately \$870 million. The NGB expected to receive most of the equipment from surplus federal stocks. Equipping of the units would be gradual, based on the buildup of the strength of the unit. Once a unit reached a minimum strength and received federal recognition, assignment of the equipment to these units would start.³ The units next

¹NGB (1946), pp. 27, 99-100.

²Ibid., pp. 71, 109.

³Headquarters units had to be at 50 percent of their authorized officers and men; other units at 25 percent of officers and 10 percent of the men. Federal recognition qualified the unit for federal pay, equipment, and training assistance. Ibid., p. 78.

would steadily progress in strength for a two-year period until they reached the desired goal of all officers and 80 percent of the authorized men in the unit. The NGB established an initial goal of organizing 435,000 men into 5,000 units within two years. The first units of the new Guard were federally recognized on 1 July 1946.¹

The ORC had many problems similar to the National Guard. It was also a nonexistent force at the end of the war. The ORC did not, however, have available armories as the Guard did and had to rely on federal appropriations to build their armories or the largesse of the National Guard to share their existing armories. The ORC did have an initial recruiting advantage; veterans received a one-grade promotion up to colonel if they joined the ORC upon discharge from the Regular Army.² This did cause an immediate excess of higher-ranking members. Most members had no desire to join the units of the ORC because they were not paid for inactive training periods--only for summer camps and time spent on active duty. Many veterans joined the reserves to preserve the rank they had attained

¹Ibid., p. 123; NGB (1947), p. 1.

²This caused resentment by regular officers, who did not receive any additional benefits at the end of the war. General Eisenhower had to publish a letter in 1947 stating that all the components had contributed to the war effort and that no favoritism would be tolerated. "The Olive Branch," Infantry Journal, July 1947, p. 54; Col. S. Legree, "We Must Get Together," Infantry Journal, May 1947, p. 28.

during the war, in case of another war. They assumed that the next war would involve a total mobilization similar to the last one. Initially the ORC was not allowed to recruit nonveterans, which hindered the growth of the proposed units. The ORC was in direct competition with the Guard and the reserves of the other services for money, men, and equipment.¹

The ORC would have three types of units--classes A, B, and C. Class A units would ultimately be at the same strength as the National Guard, with all officers and 80 percent of the men assigned. Class B units would have a cadre of officers and enlisted men only, and class C units would only have a cadre of officers. While the class A units would be equipped at the same level as the National Guard, the class B and C units would only have sufficient equipment for training purposes. The class B units would be used for the mobilization three to six months after M-day; the class C units would be used for the mobilization process from six to twelve months after M-day. The ORC would have twenty-five divisions, all organized as class A units--eighteen infantry, four airborne, and three armored--as the mainstay of the Army mobilization base. The organization of these divisions would place the ORC in further competition with the National Guard.²

¹ORC, Army Talk #158, pp. 3-6.

²Ibid.; President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security, by Karl T. Compton,

Army plans still hinged on the enactment of UMT to fill the reserve components. President Truman appointed a commission in late 1946 to study the need for UMT and make recommendations on how to execute UMT if they felt it was necessary. Dr. Karl Compton, president of MIT, headed the commission. Because civilians composed the committee, their findings could give UMT a sense of legitimacy.¹

The committee, in its findings published in May 1947, determined that the nation needed UMT as a part of the nation's defense system; "the United States simply cannot take the chance of facing future warfare without large reserves of men trained and disciplined in the use of weapons and in the techniques of warfare."² Compton believed that UMT would be useful in both conventional and atomic warfare. The trainees would enhance the civil defense of the nation in either case. One of the primary threats to the nation would be fifth columns (internal sabotage and subversion) and, Compton recognized that a pool of trained men could help to prevent this.³ Compton stressed that the

Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 427-428; Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, by Gordon Gray, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 33, 171. The Army would have 726,000 men in the ORC units while the Air Force had 150,000. A total of 8,400 units were to be ultimately organized.

¹Other members included Anna Rosenberg, later Assistant Secretary of Defense for manpower during the Korean War, and Charles Wilson, later Secretary of Defense during the Eisenhower administration. Compton report, p. vii.

²Ibid., p. 18.

³Ibid., pp. 9-14.

reserves would benefit from UMT by having a continuous flow of trained replacements. This would eliminate the need for continuous training of new recruits by the reserves components. Moreover, the UMT graduate, having received over 1,000 hours of training, would increase the readiness of the reserve units which were receiving only 300 hours of training annually. The reserves must not, however, be neglected because of UMT; it was not a panacea, warned Compton. Compton did not believe that the reserve components could complete their organization without UMT. The report estimated that the Guard could only voluntarily recruit half of its organization; the ORC, similarly, would be able to recruit only one-third of its organization. This shortfall would severely inhibit the ability of the reserves to fulfill their mobilization role.¹

Funding was also a concern of the Compton Commission. It estimated that UMT would cost \$1.75 billion a year to operate. This, coupled with the estimated costs for the completed Guard and Organized Reserves would cause a \$3 billion increase in the planned defense budget. The proposed postwar military budget for all the services was only \$14 billion. Compton did not believe the public mood was amenable to an increase in the budget of this magnitude.² In 1947, UMT again did not pass Congress.

¹Ibid., pp. 423-427.

²Ibid., pp. 36, 423-428.

The Regular Army also had difficulty achieving its goal during 1946-1947. The Truman administration calculated funds available for defense according to the "remainder method." Under this method, the armed forces would receive one-third of the funds remaining after all other fixed governmental expenses had been established. President Truman believed that an excessive federal budget would damage the nation's economy. He also had difficulty with Congress, which was concerned with the need for a balanced budget and a tax cut to stimulate the economy. Both Truman and Congress feared another depression arising from an excessive federal budget. Truman considered American industrial potential a part of the defensive structure. He believed that it had played a significant role in the victory in World War II. It was, therefore, necessary to preserve this potential. The low budgets had a direct effect on the ability of the Army to complete its planned mobilization structure.¹

The Regular Army declined in strength at an alarming rate after the war. The Army's peak strength, of over eight million men in 1945, sagged to less than two million twelve months later. The combat efficiency of the divisions disappeared because of the War Department policy of releasing men individually rather than by units. This

¹Ibid., p. 90; "Seven Fundamental Factors," Infantry Journal, June 1947, p. 53.

destroyed the units. While this policy did reward those who had been in the service the longest, it destroyed the effectiveness of the Army.¹

The Army had been under pressure from Congress and the public to stop inducting men. The Selective Service Act had been renewed by Congress in May 1946 because of the need for occupation forces. President Truman had promised at that time that efforts would be made to convert the military into an all-volunteer force. The Army stopped inducting men in October 1946 after a successful recruiting program; over one million men joined during the previous year. Most of these enlistments were the result of the availability of GI Bill benefits only to those enlisting before October 1946. Additionally, Congress had passed the Armed Forces Recruitment Act in October 1945, which increased pay and benefits for the serviceman. Most of these enlistments were for short periods of time, however, and this caused concern for the future of the Army.²

¹Sparrow, pp. 265, 287; The limiting factor on demobilization was the availability of transportation to redeploy the men home. The rapid decrease in the size of the Army resulted in the loss of over 75 percent of the equipment that was located overseas. Congressional pressure forced the Army to abandon its demobilization plans. When they announced a slowdown in the demobilization in December 1946, there had been riots by the troops in several overseas locations. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Demobilization of the Army. S. Doc. 90, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, pp. 1-10.

²James M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945-1970 (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1971), pp. 44-58: "The Army's Strength," Infantry Journal, December 1946, p. 52.

The Army would have a difficult time meeting its goal of 1.07 million men by July 1947 in spite of its excess strength in early 1947. All the inductees from the wartime period--73,000 men--had to be discharged by the summer. Moreover, half of the recent enlistments had been for twenty-four months or less, causing a high rate of turnover. Most of the recent enlistees had filled the positions occupied by the 900,000 inductees discharged in 1946; the level of experienced men in the Army became very low and the effectiveness of the units was minimal. Enlistments would have to average 40,000 men a month if the Army was to meet its July goal. The loss of GI Bill benefits and the ready availability of jobs in the civilian sector hindered the chances that sufficient men would join to maintain the Army's strength. The wartime selective service law expired on schedule in March 1947 and Congress established the Office of Selective Service Records to maintain records and prepare contingency plans for reestablishment of the system if it was needed.¹

While UMT was mustering so little Congressional support, Guard and Organized Reserves organizational efforts changed drastically as a result of a War Department directive

¹"The Army's Strength," Infantry Journal, December 1946, pp. 52-53; U.S., Office of Selective Service Records, Report of the Director 1947-1948, p. 9; "All Regulars," Infantry Journal, April 1947, p. 52; "The Recruiting Goal," Army Information Digest, March 1947, pp. 48-49.

in December 1946 clarifying the "Approved Policies." This directive was the handywork of Generals Walsh and Reckord. They had used their influence with Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower to get the directive approved. The directive gave the Guard priority in all reserve matters. The Guard would be authorized to organize all its units at full strength and with all equipment, in order to be prepared for the M-day mission. The ORC, on the other hand, would not have any class A divisions; the only ORC class A units would be those that the Regular Army and National Guard could not organize for the M-day force. The Guard had initially expected the ORC units to be only service units, but the War Department plans to organize ORC combat divisions into a new class, A 2 which would be similar to Guard units, upset the Guard and the Guard Association. The NGA believed that the Regular Army was holding back surplus equipment from guard units in order to equip these ORC units. The Guard saw this move as a threat to its existence as the primary reserve force and another attempt by the Regular Army to establish one federal reserve under the "Army Clause" rather than the "Militia Clause" of the Constitution.¹

Before the new draft was released in December 1946,

¹"General Eisenhower Re-Affirms National Guard Priority as Combat Element of M-Day Force," The National Guardsman, March 1947, pp. 4-5; "War Department Directive Clarifies National Guard Status," The National Guardsman, March 1947, p. 30.

Secretary Patterson and General Eisenhower met with National Guard Association and Reserve Officers Association representatives to insure that they approved of the directive's contents. The Guard received priority on the assignment of equipment and pay for all their members. The status of the Organized Reserves was clear, "The Organized Reserve Corps will supply, within the M-day Force, only those units [A units] which the Regular Army and the National Guard cannot organize, equip, train, and maintain."¹

The Guard progressed steadily in its organization in late 1946 and 1947. It reached a strength of 80,000 by July 1947. A national recruiting drive in September-November 1947 more than doubled its strength. Dubbed operation 88,888, the goal of the drive was to recruit a man a minute during the two-month period. President Truman, a former guardsman who had served in World War I, opened the campaign on 16 September 1947, seven years after the federalization of the first guard unit for World War II. While the Guard did not meet the ultimate goal, it did recruit over 81,000 men.²

The Guard, however, still had other problems. The armory situation had not changed. General Butler Miltonberger, the Chief of the NGB, estimated that 3,000 armories would be

¹"War Department Directive Clarifies National Guard Status," The National Guardsman, March 1947, p. 30.

²NGB (1948), p. 9.

needed to house the Guard. Only 1,000 adequate armories were available with an additional 500 others needing repair. The Guard required 1,500 new armories at a cost of over \$200 million. While the policies drawn up by General Reckord required that the federal government help pay for these, congressional approval was slow in coming, and the armories would not be built until after the Korean War.¹

The lack of Regular Army instructors was another problem for the Guard. Only half of the authorized instructors had been assigned to the Guard during 1947. The Army was short of officers, and National Guard duty was low on the list of priority assignments. This situation led to a Department of the Army decision to assign reserve officers to Guard duty as this was the only way the positions could be filled.²

The "Approved Policies" contained a six-year plan to reorganize the Guard. The first two years set up the initial organization of the units. The next four years were to be for the progression of the units in increasingly larger maneuvers. Over half of the units had been federally recognized by the end of 1947. General Miltonberger planned a progressive expansion of the Guard so that it could be completed by 1950. This plan was predicated on the passage of UMT. He projected an interim goal of 300,000 men by

¹Ibid., p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 47.

mid 1949. General Miltonberger realized the primary need for the growth of the Guard.

The budget problem is another story. The outlook for appropriations is not nearly as bright as the other factors. The new National Guard is going to cost more money. We cannot build an expanding organization with a static or diminishing budget.¹

Several changes in the policies toward new recruits aided the Guard's recruiting efforts. In 1947 the War Department changed the restriction that only 10 percent of the lower-ranking enlisted men could be married. Initially the limit was raised to 50 percent and finally lifted altogether. Additionally, the Guard relaxed the restriction on the maximum age of new guardsmen. It had been thirty-five, but was changed for those in critical specialties and noncombat slots.² Moreover, legislation in 1947 allowed the Guard to enlist seventeen-year-olds for the first time. Formerly, only the Navy could recruit men of this age which had hampered the recruiting efforts of the Army Reserve

¹NGB (1947), pp. 72-75, 129; U.S., War Department, Our National Guard, Army Talk #154, p. 8. General Miltonberger left the NGB during the summer of 1947 because of ill health. He had been Chief of the Bureau since the end of the war. During World War II he had been an Assistant Division Commander in the 35th Infantry Division. His successor, Major General Kenneth Cramer, had also been an Assistant Division Commander during the war, in the 24th Infantry Division. Cramer had been the Commander of the 43rd Infantry Division of the National Guard after the war. Both men had problems with the NGA during their terms because they had risen to the NGB from field service instead of the traditional route of adjutant general service. Both had their authority successfully challenged by General Walsh during their tenure. Major General Kenneth Cramer, "M-Day and the New National Guard," Army Information Digest, September 1947, pp. 2-3; "New Chief," Infantry Journal, August 1947, p. 50.

²"Restrictions Relaxed," Infantry Journal, May 1947, p. 60; Colby, p. 15.

forces.¹

The Guard was still undergoing the problems of any structural reorganization. A commander's report in June 1947 summed up the difficulties of reorganization

Many of the potential members who do come in and see the men moving boxes, who see the poor storage-room and class room facilities, of who hear that the men had only been paid once since last October, refuse to sign up.²

The ORC was faring even worse in its reorganization efforts. Finding manpower was not the problem; convincing the men to join the organized units was. While the ORC had signed up over 500,000 officers and 630,000 enlisted men, they had only formed half the scheduled units, most at minimal strength. Class A units initially had to have only 80 percent of the authorized officers and 40 percent of the men. To maintain this status, the unit had to recruit 70 percent of the men within one year. It was November 1947 before the ORC formed the first class A units. By the end of 1947, only 4 class A and 225 class B units had been established. The lack of pay for inactive training, a benefit the National Guard enjoyed, hampered the ORC's efforts to organize units. Most ORC members were not assigned to any unit and consequently, did nothing to maintain their proficiency. Only one-fourth of the 200,000 men needed for the M-day units were expected to join without

¹NGB (1947), p. 111.

²Ibid., p. 24.

inactive duty pay.¹

The refusal of the War Department to allow the ORC to recruit nonveterans hurt efforts at reorganization. This restriction was finally lifted in early 1947. The ORC had the same problems with armories and Regular Army instructors as did the National Guard. The ORC class A units were to participate in a six-year training sequence structured along the same lines as the Guard. The non-M-day forces would have only two years for unit training. These units would not participate in higher level maneuvers.²

Because the ORC was not completely organized into units, a major problem was keeping track of the members. One of the functions of the ORC was to provide individual replacements for other forces. Not only had the War Department lost track of many of the men, but it did not remain informed of the individual's progress in the civilian world. These new skills could be easily converted into military specialties in the event of a future emergency. In addition, the Army did not periodically determine if members were still physically suited for service.³

While the reserve components were struggling to build

¹"First Class A Units," Infantry Journal, November 1947, p. 52; "Progress Report," Infantry Journal, August 1947, p. 51; LTG C. P. Hall, "Organizing and Training the New Army," Army Information Digest, November 1947, p. 4; "Postwar Military Establishment," Army Information Digest, February 1947, p. 20.

²ORC, Army Talk #158, p. 4; "The ORC Infantry Training Program," Infantry Journal, October 1946, pp. 55-56.

³UMT Hearings, 1947, p. 4483; "To the Editor," Infantry Journal, September 1946, pp. 57-58.

up their organizations, the Regular Army continued to tear down forces by demobilizing divisions and reducing the strength of the existing divisions. The Army, in July 1947, was 150,000 men below its target figure of 1.07 million men. President Truman had ordered this reduction for budgetary reasons. The available reserve in the United States was down to two divisions, and the remainder of the Army was involved in the occupation of Japan and Europe.¹

The ground forces of the United States were at a low point while the tension between the United States and Russia was increasing. Trouble had occurred in Iran, Turkey, and Greece soon after the war. President Truman had announced his containment policy in early 1947 as a result of these problems. The United States, he noted, would react to any future Russian aggressive moves in Europe and the Middle East. The peace treaty to end World War II was not forthcoming. Diplomatic relations between the countries continually worsened. While the United States demobilized rapidly, the Russians maintained a large ready army in Europe and the Far East. Korea and Germany, meanwhile, split into two nations along the lines of the existing military occupation by the United States and Russia.

There were critics of the American military system at this time. Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times felt

¹Sparrow, p. 263.

that the reliance on the reserves was a waste of money. The proponents of UMT admitted that the graduates would require additional training before they could be used in combat units even with twelve months of UMT training. Baldwin favored the development of strategic sea and air forces to strike back at the enemy wherever an attack occurred. These retaliation forces, not ground forces, would be needed at the start of the war. Baldwin believed that emphasis on UMT detracted from the real needs of the United States.¹

Baldwin also noted that the only effective reserve would be a federal one. The Guard should be relegated to the role of a state militia force, and the ORC should be the only federal reserve. This would end the competition between the two organizations. Baldwin felt that the reserve could not be an effective M-day force because of the limited training time available.²

Congressional approval of unification of the armed forces in late 1947 changed the mobilization potential of the Army. The air elements of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves split from the Army units. The NGB still controlled both National Guard elements, in order to simplify the communication between it and state headquarters.

¹Gerhardt, pp. 69-70.

²Baldwin, noting that Russia had extremely weak sea and air forces, believed that the United States had an overall superior position. UMT Hearings, 1947, p. 4485; "A Dim View," Infantry Journal, May 1947, p. 60.

James Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense. He had been the Naval Secretary and had led the fight in Congress for a federated rather than a unified defense structure. This federated structure was the defense organization passed by Congress in 1947; the service secretaries still maintained strong powers and could appeal decisions over the defense secretary to the President.

Unification separated the Air Force from the Army. The Army, however, still had to support the Air Force for the next two years. Army signal, engineers, and medical personnel had to work for the Air Force until they formed their own service units. The Air Force gained 400,000 of the 1.07 million men in the Army and 20,000 of the 50,000 officer slots.¹

One of Forrestal's first acts was to appoint a committee headed by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, to study the reserve situation in depth.² A thorough study of the reserve was necessary. The mobilization plans had assumed UMT and adequate funding would be available. The stress of occupation, which absorbed half of the men of the Regular Army, upset the Army plans as well. A more realistic mobilization plan that considered cost as well as American commitments and strategy had to be formulated.

¹"Army-Air Force Agreements," Army Information Digest, November 1947, pp. 48-52.

²U.S., War Department, Unification--What It Means and How It Works, Army Talk #194, pp. 3-8.

The top army leadership also agreed that a review was needed. General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff noted before a Congressional hearing in 1947, "Today your Reserve components ready to fight in this country are almost zero. . . ." ¹ If a war came, Collins admitted, the only available forces for the emergency would be the pool of World War II veterans. No system had been developed since the War to insure that these men would not have to be the first to fight again. ²

¹UMT Hearings, 1947, p. 4483.

²Ibid., p. 4470; "Postwar Military Establishment," Army Information Digest, February 1947, p. 29.

CHAPTER III

FISCAL REALITY: THE EIGHTEEN DIVISION PLAN

American relations with Russia deteriorated rapidly in early 1948. In February the Russians had engineered a coup in Czechoslovakia, and this coup had caused President Truman to call for a lengthy review of the American military situation. The facts were not encouraging; the Regular Army was down to 552,000 men. The available strategic reserve was only two and one-third divisions, and these units were not up to full wartime strength. General Alfred Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff, reported to President Truman and Secretary Forrestal that the deployment of just one division abroad would require the mobilization of reserve units. The Russians, Gruenther added, had over one hundred divisions available in Eastern Europe.¹

President Truman received alarming news from his commander in Berlin in March. General Lucius Clay reported on 5 March that he perceived a change in the attitude of

¹Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 369-376; U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Universal Military Training. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, pp. 52, 344. Hereafter cited as UMT Hearings, 1948. Not only was the Army in poor condition, but was losing strength at a rate of 30,000 men a month.

the Russians and he believed that war could occur at any time. This report, coupled with the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, forced President Truman to decide to rebuild the armed forces. On 17 March 1948 he requested drastic changes in American military and foreign policy. He asked Congress to reinstitute selective service as a short-term solution to the manpower problem in the Regular Army. In addition, he requested reconsideration of UMT as the long-term solution to the manpower problem of the reserves. Finally, he asked Congress to speed up their consideration of the Marshall Plan--a program designed to provide economic assistance for the reconstruction of the Western European nations. Truman believed that the danger of internal communist takeovers would exist until Western Europe recovered from the war.¹

Congress had to consider other items as part of Truman's request in addition to selective service. The Army desired an increase in its authorized strength from 669,000 (the Army's share of the 1.07 million men developed by the War Department in 1946) to 782,000. The Truman

¹UMT Hearings, 1948, pp. 33, 328-339; Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, ed., The Truman Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 269. Neither Truman nor Forrestal saw a conflict between these two manpower solutions. UMT would be for the younger men while selective service would induct older men who had not served in World War II. Truman intended to induct men only until UMT had produced a sufficient trained manpower reserve.

administration's limit on the size of the defense budget meant that an increase in the size of one service might require a decrease in the funds available for the other services. A bitter fight ensued over the size of the defense forces. Under the Unification Act of 1947 Secretary Forrestal did not have the power to force a solution on the three services.¹

The lack of clearly defined missions for each service intensified the rivalry among them. The Air Force, based on its performance in World War II, argued that all aircraft, including those based on carriers, should be under its control. Moreover, the Air Force felt strategic bombing would be the foundation of American security. The Navy, on the other hand, had little faith in strategic bombing and believed that more aircraft carriers were necessary. This dispute would culminate in the famous B-36 and naval carrier disputes in 1949. Each side was able to carry its arguments to the President, Congress, and press. The Army, bogged down with occupation during this time, did not enter this controversy and had to plan to develop forces that would support the missions of other services.

After Truman's speech requesting reorganization of the armed forces, Secretary Forrestal appeared before the

¹The actual increase in the Army under the proposal would be 240,000 men. The authorized strength of the Army would only increase 113,000 men. The Army had never reached its authorized strength during 1947-1948.

House Armed Services Committee to request a 240,000-man increase in the size of the Army. These additional men would be developed into a mobile strike force. This force was included in a supplemental request by Forrestal for \$3 billion in excess of the presidential ceiling on defense spending. In his original request, Forrestal programed 72 percent of the additional funds for an increase in the size of the Army and Marines (11,000-man increase for the Marines). This was clearly not in the interests of the Air Force and Navy.¹

General Omar Bradley argued the army position during the congressional hearings.² The army's new strategy was based on the need for immediately available forces, not gradual mobilization of men over a period of time. This plan acknowledged that Congress would not fund the Army at a level which would totally support the first 4.5 million man plan. Bradley's plan called for a mobile strike force of eighteen divisions that would be immediately available and would support the strategic mission of the Air Force. The other units of the Army and the reserves would be funded

¹Millis, p. 400; U.S., National Military Establishment, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army 1948, pp. 75-78.

²Bradley, a West Point classmate of General Eisenhower, had commanded the largest land force in American history during the Invasion of Europe at Normandy and the subsequent drive into Germany that finally ended the war. After the war he had been the head of the Veterans Administration. Bradley became the Chief of Staff in February 1948 when General Eisenhower retired. He would later become the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949 and remained in this position throughout the Korean War.

at a lower level of readiness in order to keep the eighteen divisions ready. Congressional approval was necessary, however, before this plan could be implemented.

Bradley, following Forrestal before the committee, told how the Army planned to use the additional men. The critical need of the Army was for a mobile strike force located in the United States, and available for any contingencies. This force would number 192,000 men and consist of three infantry, one armored, and one airborne divisions. Additionally, two cavalry regiments, five RCT's, twelve artillery battalions, and forty anti-aircraft battalions would round out the combat elements of the force.¹ These units would represent three-quarters of the total force; the rest would be the support units. The new mobile force would contain three times as much combat power of the existing one.²

The mobile strike force was necessary to support the strategic needs of the United States if it was attacked. The Army had to be available to support the Air Force's mission of retaliation against the enemy homeland. This required the taking and holding of forward bases for the Air Force as well as the denial of the use of these bases to

¹The United States only had two anti-aircraft units at this time; the change reflected the fear of airpower in future conflicts.

²UMT Hearings, 1948, pp. 349-351. Only a small part of the increase was to be part of the occupation force overseas.

the enemy. The Army would need at least six to ten divisions to secure these bases, especially if they were already under enemy control. Bradley believed that a typical base, which would support twenty air groups, would need seven divisions with a total ground force of 375,000 men. This forward base would need 12,500 tons of supplies a day, necessitating a strong Navy as well. Bradley argued that these bases required a balance between the three services; all contributed directly to the nation's security. The 200,000 men in the mobile strike force would be the ready elements to support the Air Force in its mission. The Army still needed, Bradley noted, a reserve force to assist the strike force and furnish the mobilization base of the nation.¹

Bradley desired to increase the Army to a total of 782,000 men by March 1949. He anticipated that selective service would be required to bring in 200,000 men and the additional 280,000 needed (considering the 240,000 that were scheduled to be released from the service during this period) would enlist as a direct result of selective service; they would join to avoid being inducted. This was, however, the short-term solution. UMT was the only available long-term solution offered by Bradley and the administration.²

General Bradley noted that the Army had two unique

¹Ibid., pp. 330-331, 341, 352-353.

²Ibid., pp. 353-354.

factors that made it less combat effective than the other two services. Support of the Air Force accounted for 10 percent of the active Army's strength; in Alaska, for example, all 7,000 men supported the Air Force. Secondly, 200,000 men were part of the occupation effort in Japan, Germany, Austria, and Trieste. He stressed that the Army could rebuild the mobile reserve without an increase in the authorized strength if the occupation mission was terminated. As it was, the Army currently had no ready units overseas.¹ To Bradley the mobile force represented "a minimum element of the Army team which can lend the essential weight to the voice of the United States in world affairs."²

General J. Lawton Collins, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff, presented the Army views on UMT to Congress. The plan would require true universal training. Only those mentally unfit, physically unfit, or who had joined the service before their eighteenth birthday were exempt from the training program. Of the 850,000 men that would undergo UMT training each year, the Army would receive over half according to Collins. These men would be given six months basic training and then would have several options available to them. They could remain in the UMT program for six

¹Ibid., p. 348.

²Ibid., p. 350.

additional months and receive further specialty training. They could attend college ROTC or a trade school to provide the Army with needed specialists. Those who did not desire to take these options would be assigned to one of the reserve components for up to six years, depending on the type of unit they joined.¹

The UMT's would make a difference in the future readiness of the reserves to fight a war. Without UMT, Collins estimated, the pool of trained men (mostly World War II veterans) would decrease to half a million by 1957 from the 2 million in 1947. With UMT this pool would reach the goal of 3 million men by 1957, the number desired in case of a mobilization. In addition, with UMT the National Guard could reach its authorized strength of 650,000 men by 1957. The Organized Reserves, with only 35,000 men in all its organized units at this time, would be able to fill the 390,000 positions in the class A units and the 505,000 enlisted men needed to complete the force. Collins stressed that UMT was the only answer to the manpower troubles of the reserves. He felt it was the best program to reduce the mobilization time of the reserves.²

The UMT plan offered other advantages. The Selective Service System would register and classify all men for the

¹Ibid., pp. 355-361.

²Ibid.

UMT program and would, therefore, be in a state of readiness if needed. The men in the UMT program would not be members of the military; they would be organized in the National Security Training Corps, and this would blunt any criticism that the program would foster militarism in the United States. This Corps would be under the control of a commission composed of two civilians and one military man. The Army would, however, require 95,000 men to conduct its portion of the training.¹

The principal advantage of the UMT, Collins argued, was the time advantage it offered in case of mobilization. During a three-year enlistment, the average guardsman received only 20 percent of the training necessary to be combat ready. With UMT the trainee would have 40 percent of the training by the time he finished the six months course. The M-day units would therefore, have 60 percent of the training completed for combat; they would still not, however, be completely ready on M-day. At least six months of full-time training after mobilization would be necessary. The program would be an overall plus for the reserve units which would now have a continual flow of trained men. Because all UMT graduates would possess basic military skills, the units could conduct training at advanced levels. Collins warned

¹Ibid. The men needed to train the UMT's were not included in the Army's authorized strength. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Selective Service. H.R. 6274, 6401, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 6239. Hereafter cited as House, Selective Service.

that in the next war the United States would not have the two years that it had had in World War II to mobilize and train the reserves before taking the offensive against the enemy.¹

The Army's plan was, however, flexible. If the occupation ended or when the available number of trained UMT graduates filled the Army's needs, the Army would, according to Secretary of the Army Frank Royall, be willing to accept a cut in its active strength since the overall readiness would not be affected.²

The Selective Service Act passed Congress and President Truman signed it on 24 June 1948. Congress imposed a two-year limit on the life of the act. The law was structured like selective service of World War II. The NGA did, however, succeed in having two important provisions inserted into the Act; the Act contained the Congressional Statement of Policy that the Guard would remain the first line of defense. In addition, reservists who were members of M-day units, were to receive a deferment from selective service. This included all guardsmen and some members of the Organized Reserves. To receive the deferment, however, they had to be members of the unit before 24 June, the date

¹UMT Hearings, 1948, p. 358; MG Kenneth F. Cramer, "The National Guard in the Post-War Military Establishment," Military Review, June 1948, pp. 7-9.

²UMT Hearings, 1948, p. 345.

the President signed the law. Congress also deferred veterans of World War II.¹

The Selective Service Act had an immediate effect on the reserve components even before it was signed. The critical deferment date of the presidential signature was well publicized. Men of induction age flocked to the reserve units in June to be deferred. The strength of the Guard rose 66,422 men in the first two weeks of June; the Army had to impose a moratorium on recruiting for the Guard soon neared the appropriation limit. Congress refused to authorize additional Guard appropriations to support more than the 320,000 men it had in June. The rapid increase in the size of the Guard produced another problem, as uniforms and equipment were still in short supply.²

In April, Congress agreed to increase the strength of the Regular Army. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after a difficult fight, agreed on the final authorized strength of

¹House, Selective Service, pp. 6520-6523; National Military Establishment, Report 1948, pp. 75-77. Those inducted had to serve twenty-one months. The law also allowed voluntary enlistments for the same period of time. The armed forces could not induct men under the Selective Service Act until September; this provision was designed to encourage voluntary enlistments and decrease future induction calls.

²National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 77; "The Guard Shows 'Em," The National Guardsman, August 1948, p. 7. The Selective Service Act did not stimulate enlistments in the ORC because it did not have organized units that met the criterion for deferment.

837,000 men. The Air Force, led by Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, balked at Forrestal's proposal to increase the Air Force by an insignificant number. Symington demanded that the Air Force be expanded to the seventy groups it deemed necessary for national security. This resulted in counterdemands by the other services for their desired level of funding. General Bradley noted that an increase of 100,000 men in the Air Force would necessitate a 15,000-man increase in the Army if it were to provide the required support of the Air Force. Bradley therefore raised the Army strength requirement to 837,000 men. This took into account the increase needed for the support of the Air Force as well as a mobile reserve of 223,000 instead of the 192,000 previously proposed.¹

Congress approved the new authorized strength of 837,000 men but did not approve the necessary funds. The Joint Chiefs' plans would have cost three times the original three billion dollars requested by Forrestal. The Army received approval for a strength of 790,000 men plus 110,000 one-year enlistees. These one-year enlistees would be required to serve up to six years with the reserves after their one year of training had been completed. They could not be sent overseas, however, during this year. One-year enlistments were to be a short-term measure to build the

¹National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 73; "To the Congress: Our Military Requirements," Army Information Digest, June 1948, pp. 61-62.

strength of the reserves. Secretary Forrestal, President Truman, and the Joint Chiefs all subsequently approved the congressional strength as the minimum needed, considering budgetary constraints. The Army, however, would not reach this figure before the Korean War.¹

In April 1948, as part of the justification for the 837,000-man Army, General Bradley introduced the "18-25 division" concept to the House Armed Services Committee. The Berlin crisis had just occurred, throwing clearly into focus the lack of a ready reserve force. According to Bradley, the Army required a minimum of eighteen immediately available divisions in order to carry out its contingency plans. At this time the Army had only ten divisions, and none were at full strength. The "18-25 division" would, however, have to be developed gradually so that the necessary facilities and equipment could be procured within the existing budgetary constraints.²

Again Bradley argued that these units were necessary to secure the forward bases (Alaska, Iceland, Greenland, Spitbergen, and the Azores), all of which would be needed to project airpower into the enemy's homeland. Bradley noted

¹Millis, pp. 414-427; House, Selective Service, pp. 6642-43; National Military Establishment, Report 1948, pp. 75-77; "To the Congress: Our Military Requirements," Army Information Digest, June 1948, pp. 61-64. The Selective Service Act required the transfer to the reserves any soldier who completed less than thirty-three months service.

²House, Selective Service, pp. 6201-6211.

that even with eighteen divisions, he could not guarantee total security for the nation. This force would be "essentially a stop-gap, one short [sic] army, a plug in the dike until we rallied sufficient and effective reserves."¹

The eighteen divisions would require a force-in-being (M-day units ready for deployment) of 1.08 million men. Bradley proposed that the Regular Army contribute twelve divisions of this force (822,000 men plus 15,000 for Air Force support) and the reserve components contribute the remainder. There was, Bradley stressed, a risk in relying on the reserves for the balance, but this would be necessary to ease the pressures on the budget and manpower. Five of the regular divisions would be located in the United States, and the others would be in overseas locations. Even with the increase in the projected size of the strike force as part of this plan, the organization of the force would be basically the same as Bradley had proposed the previous month. The only major difference would be an increase in anti-aircraft artillery battalions from forty to fifty-eight, reflecting a concern over possible air strikes on American industry.²

Bradley stressed that the eighteen division army was not based solely on a definite number of air groups assigned to the Air Force. The larger Army would be necessary to

¹Ibid., p. 6211.

²Ibid., pp. 6211-6214.

support air bases abroad with even the minimum number of air groups necessary for offensive action (fifty-five, the current level). Moreover, the Army's needs during the first year of mobilization would total twenty-five divisions; this was the second half of the program. The eighteen division force was only the minimum for M-day. Bradley proposed that the reserve components provide an additional seven divisions. These would be integrated into the ready force gradually so that by 1952 the entire twenty-five divisions would be ready.¹

Equipping the force would be a problem. Bradley explained that the Army had enough equipment remaining from World War II to equip twenty divisions. Congress would have to provide funds to equip the remaining five divisions. The total cost of this program would double the Army's annual share of the defense budget from three billion to over seven billion dollars.²

The eighteen-division plan justified the Army's new strength of 837,000 men. By proposing the plan the Army tied its strength to the Air Force's strategic air concept. The Army stressed that there could not be strategic air without a ground force to protect the forward bases that were necessary. At this time, the nation did not have bombers

¹Ibid., pp. 6217-6219.

²Ibid., pp. 6218-6221, 6229-6231. Secretary Royall estimated that \$13 billion would be required to equip the twenty-five divisions at once.

with sufficient range to fly nonstop from the United States to the Russian homeland and return. The Army justified the eighteen-division plan by using the same rationale as the Air Force did with the seventy-group force; this was the minimum force needed to provide essential security for the nation. Bradley stressed throughout the hearings that eighteen divisions would be the minimum force necessary if he was to guarantee the security of the nation and the forward air bases. Only the Selective Service System could maintain the regular force at this level; the voluntary army had failed, Bradley claimed. In addition, only UMT could maintain the reserve forces at the level needed. The present Army was simply ineffective as structured.¹

Although selective service passed Congress, real universal training did not. The crisis in Europe cooled somewhat in late 1948, and this easing of tensions helped to defeat UMT. More importantly, President Truman and Congress decided to trade the cost of UMT for the seventy groups that the Air Force had been demanding. The cost of each was nearly the same, and Truman was simply unwilling to pay the political and economical price for both.

General Cramer of the NGB quickly endorsed the eighteen-division plan and designated the six priority divisions--26th (Massachusetts), 28th (Pennsylvania),

¹Ibid., p. 6226. The Army had been unable to attract men in a full employment economy.

31st (Mississippi-Alabama), 43rd (Connecticut-Rhode Island-Vermont, Cramer's former unit), 45th (Oklahoma) Infantry and 49th (Texas) Armored Divisions, as the Guard's initial portion of the plan. Five of these divisions had organized at least 97 percent of their authorized units; the other had completed 78 percent.¹

Although Cramer agreed with the plan, the NGA opposed it because it separated the National Guard into two categories of units. General Ellard Walsh of the NGA believed that all Guard divisions were part of the M-day force and all should be maintained at the same level. He complained that the plan was illegal because it had not been reviewed by a Section Five Committee in accordance with the National Defense Act of 1916.

The committee subsequently studied and approved the plan with some modifications. By the end of 1948 Bradley had reviewed the committee recommendations. He approved a clause in the plan which stated that the remaining Guard divisions would be maintained in a status comparable to the designated six divisions. Bradley rejected, however, Walsh's contention that the remaining guard units would be mobilized immediately after the units of the eighteen-division force because such a plan would limit the Army's ability to mobilize according to the needs of the situation. Bradley

¹NGB, 1948, p. 24; "Building the Reserve Forces," Army Information Digest, December 1948, pp. 7-9.

did agree to convert some guard units into support units for the strike force rather than use Organized Reserve units to satisfy such needs.¹

The ORC would have to be reorganized to support the strike force. Secretary of the Army Royall estimated that 325,000 officers and men in class A units would be necessary for the strike force. Moreover, 100,000 men in class B units would indirectly support this force. The ORC, as structured, could not fulfill these needs.²

Congress improved the benefits for reservists in 1948. Congress passed a retirement law, allowing veterans in the reserves to credit their wartime service toward retirement. The ORC finally received inactive duty pay that would give some of its units the same benefits as Guard units. Previously, class A units had only been paid for the fifteen-day summer camp; now they received pay for the required forty-eight weekly drill periods. The ORC could pay out only the amount of money appropriated by Congress.³

¹"Agreement Near on 'Mobile Striking Force,'" The National Guardsman, December 1948, p. 25.

²U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee Hearings, Military Function Appropriation Bill for 1949. H. R. 6771, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 4. The ORC would not gain strength from the new laws for at least a year.

³U.S., Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year 1949, p. 149; "Training Pay," Infantry Journal, August 1948, p. 43. For pay purposes the ORC was divided into four categories based on the number of drills the members performed each year.

Once Congress approved the eighteen-division plan, the army staff had to plan for the support and training of the additional men. General Jacob L. Devers, commander of all the army units in the United States (Army Field Force Command), announced plans to increase the number of training divisions from four to eight. Because of the time required to organize new training divisions, Devers decided that recruits would go directly to their combat units for basic training.¹ The basic training period was shortened in order to strengthen the combat units as rapidly as possible. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall announced that four more combat divisions would be organized within the United States, bringing the total to six. The Army planned to reach its new authorized strength by July 1949. A number of reserve officers would have to be voluntarily called to active duty to help staff the increased army.²

Not only the reserve components but Regular Army recruiting benefited from the new Selective Service Act. During the period of July to September 1948, over 128,000 men enlisted in the Army; most of these enlistments were for three years. As a result, the planned 30,000-man/month inductions were reduced. The first call for November was for only 10,000 men. This was followed by a 15,000-man call in December

¹"Fighting Men Only," Infantry Journal, August 1948, p. 41.

²"Expanding the Army," Army Information Digest, August 1948, pp. 16-17.

and another 10,000 in January 1949. January 1949 was the last month the Army used selective service; the total number of men needed had been 35,000 and Selective Service System had inducted 30,000 men. Selective service would not be used again until the Korean War. The Selective Service System did, however, continue to register and classify men during this period. General Bradley estimated that the classification procedure saved at least four months of mobilization time. Moreover, the threat of induction kept the strength of the regular and reserve forces at the budgetary level.¹

The Army stopped drafting men in early 1949 because of President Truman's limit on the defense budget. President Truman had simplified budget matters somewhat by announcing the fifteen billion dollar ceiling on the defense budget, but the services were so divided over how to disperse the available funds that they could not reach an agreement. The Secretary of Defense still did not have complete control of the three services, and Secretary Forrestal could not achieve a coordinated budget among the services for fiscal year 1950. The eighteen-division strike force never reached fruition before the Korean War because of the budgetary limits.²

¹National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 77; U.S. Selective Service System, Selective Service Under the 1948 Act 24 June 1948-9 July 1950, pp. 18, 125-128, 248.

²Truman had just won the presidency in an upset election; he now believed that the people supported him in his economy measures. Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon, From Forrestal to McNamara (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 59; "Draft Calls Reduced," Infantry Journal, January 1949, p. 43.

Because of budgetary problems, the military could not use the UMT graduates to solve its manpower problems. The Defense Department, therefore, turned its attention to improvement of the reserve forces. In June 1948 the Gray Board, tasked with making an impartial review of the reserve components, published its findings. The board challenged several of the accepted views concerning mobilization. Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray headed the board.¹ Other members of the board included John N. Brown and Cornelius Whitney, Assistant Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force respectively, and one general officer from each of the services. The Army representative--Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain--had served as a guardsman for twenty-eight years in the Oklahoma National Guard.

The most controversial recommendation of the board was the need for abolishing the National Guard by its integration into a single federal reserve force with the Organized Reserves. The board noted several inherent problems with the reserve structure as it was presently organized. First, mobilization of the National Guard required the transfer of all equipment from state to federal control,

¹Gray had entered the Army as a private in 1942; he later became an officer and served in Europe. Gray was a lawyer and newspaper publisher from North Carolina. At the end of World War II he became an Assistant Secretary of War and was responsible for the industrial reconversion of the army. President Truman promoted him to the secretary's position in 1949. "New Secretary," Infantry Journal, July 1949, pp. 36-37.

a lengthy process. Moreover, both reserve forces could be mobilized only upon a declaration of an emergency by Congress, which hindered its ability to be ready immediately. The board noted that the federal government had no positive control over the Guard. The federal government could enforce minimum standards only by withholding money for training or federal recognition of the unit or officers. The government could not force the Guard to achieve higher standards. During peacetime the state governments had primary responsibility for the Guard, and minimum responsibility for national security.¹

The Gray Board also mentioned the difficulty the Regular Army had coordinating the training and organizing the units located in different states. These split units were responsible to their state governors and then to the common commander outside their state. Because of this joint training of a unit of this type required the concurrence of both states involved.²

To protect the interests of the reservists, the board proposed the organization of a Reserve Forces Policy Board, composed of equal representation of reservists and regulars. This board would review all matters concerning the administration of the reserves and insure that policies

¹Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security, by Gordon Gray, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 10-20. Hereafter cited as Gray Board.

²Ibid., pp. 11-23. The ORC, Gray noted, was also in unsatisfactory shape. Few of the units had been organized and the members had little incentive to remain active in the organization.

were equitably applied. In addition, Gray recommended the appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. According to the board, there should be no difference in the organization, training, supply or administration of the reserve and the regular forces. For this reason, the board proposed the abolition of the NGB and suggested that the army staff assume the responsibility for the reserves.¹

The National Guard and Organized Reserves were not presently capable of conducting combat operations on M-day, Gray concluded. The Army had to assume that the first day of mobilization (M-day) would also be the first day of combat (D-day). Gray believed that the plan of 1946 was no longer valid. Future mobilization planning could not be based on the maintenance of the minimum units in the Regular Army and the balance in the reserves. He stressed that units which could not be maintained at an acceptable level in the reserve forces had to be organized as part of the Regular Army so as to be available on M-day.²

The report also noted a need for a state militia force. The present National Guard was, however, too large

¹Ibid., pp. 18-23; "Reserve Forces For National Security," Army Informational Digest, September 1948, pp. 15-16.

²Gray Board, pp. 32-27; "Reserve Forces For National Security," Army Informational Digest, September 1948, pp. 17-18. The Army was out of balance because of the inefficiency of the reserve forces according to Gray. Only by concentrating on the formation of units in the active as opposed to the reserve sector could this balance be restored.

for the needs of the state for disaster assistance and the protection vital to industries during wartime. This state force would prevent sabotage and fifth column activities. It would not have a role in the mobilization of combat units.¹

Gray concluded that the reserve components could not be effective unless a system to insure a continuous flow of trained personnel into the reserves was found. This implied the need for UMT, but the board warned that the mobilization requirements would be the same regardless of the status of UMT. Without UMT a larger active force was necessary, but the Army could not continue to wait for passage of UMT. The mobilization plans had to be based on reality.²

The reaction of the Board to the report was predictable. General Walsh considered this to be another battle in the long war between the Regular Army and the Guard over federalization. To Walsh the problems with the Guard stemmed from the failure of the federal government to fully organize and equip the Guard. Walsh predicted that the recommendations would never pass Congress because the rights of the states would be infringed upon if the Guard was federalized.³

¹Gray Board, pp. 9-10.

²Ibid., pp. 6, 49-51, 89, 99. The Board published a letter from General John Palmer in which he supported the Board's conclusion that a reserve force organized under the militia clause was inherently unsound.

³"The Battle is On!" The National Guardsman, September 1948, pp. 3-4; "Counter-Attack!" The National

Walsh, as part of his rationale for maintaining the current guard, pointed to the difference in the ability of the two reserves to organize since World War II. The Organized Reserves had failed to organize as an effective force and most of its men were still not assigned to units. Walsh asserted that the board's findings were illegal until the Section Five Committee reviewed the findings. The Reserve Officers Association, however, supported the merger of the two reserves.¹

Secretary of Defense Forrestal faced a dilemma with the recommendations of the Gray Board. The majority of their recommendations dealt with the administrative functioning of the reserves and could easily be approved. Forrestal knew, however, that the Army National Guard had a traditional role in defense and a strong political organization. He, therefore, rejected army reserve unification. He did initially accept the plan to federalize the

Guardian, October 1948, pp. 2-3. The Conference of Governors, meeting in September, adopted a resolution condemning the findings of the Gray Board.

¹"AG's Buck Federalization," The National Guardian, April 1949, p. 2; "Gray Board's Task," Infantry Journal, April 1948, pp. 58-59; "The Battle is On!" The National Guardian, September 1948, p. 5; "The National Guard--What of its future?" The National Guardian, April 1948, p. 6. Walsh noted that the Guard could easily assimilate the ORC class A units into its organization. The remainder of the ORC would become part of the inactive Guard. This plan was later proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Reserve Officers Association successfully lobbied for its defeat.

Air Force National Guard, but would later reject this recommendation under the pressure of the NGA and its lobbyists. Forrestal did desire that the federal government have more effective control of the two guard elements regardless of their status.¹

In late 1948, President Truman ordered a further examination of the reserve forces. Truman issued Executive Order 10007 in October directing Secretary Forrestal to report to the President on the steps that had been taken to strengthen the reserve components. In addition, the President ordered Forrestal to complete the organization of the reserve forces. In an accompanying letter to the Secretary, Truman outlined some ideas for consideration. He intimated that each service should have a high ranking officer for reserve affairs, as an assistant to the Chief of Staff. Moreover, the services should assign quality officers to instruct the reserves, should develop better training programs for the reserves, and should provide better training facilities. The Executive Order came on the eve of the 1948 election that Truman was to win in an upset. Truman announced, however, that the order was a result of the findings of the Gray Board.²

¹U.S., National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense 1948, pp. 158-160.

²"A Call to the Nation," Army Information Digest, December 1948, pp. 3-6.

Forrestal reported his progress to Truman in December. The Army had appointed Major General Charles Ryder as the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Army for Civilian Components to monitor the Army reserves. The ORC had also been assigning more men to the units; 146,000 of these were already in the critical mobilization base units. The remaining recommendations proposed by the Gray Board would require congressional approval; Forrestal reported that a legislative package was being prepared for submission to Congress. This was the origin of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The other problems of the reserves, armories, equipment, and training funds, were all part of the availability of funds from Congress and the administration. Truman's budget ceiling would not allow this increase in funds.¹

Shortly after Forrestal had submitted his report to the President, Army Secretary Royall appointed his own committee to study the reserve problems. The committee was to determine the appropriate strength and organization of the army reserve forces under the existing budgetary constraints.

¹House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, p. 12; "Status and Needs of the Reserve Forces," Army Information Digest, February 1949, pp. 54-57; General Ryder had commanded a National Guard division, the 34th, during World War II. "AG's Buck Federalization," The National Guardsman, April 1949, p. 4.

James F. Byrnes, the former Secretary of State and Supreme Court Justice, headed the committee. Charles Wilson, president of General Electric Company and later Secretary of Defense, was on the committee. The committee had a total of twelve members, three each from the Regular Army, Organized Reserves, National Guard, and civilian life.¹ General Walsh was one of the Guard members; General Mark Clark, commander of the Army Field Forces Command during the Korean mobilization, was a Regular Army member; and Major General Julius Ochs Adler (ORC), vice president of the New York Times and later member of the Civilian Components Policy Board, represented the Organized Reserves. The committee had to plan a new reserve basis without the assumptions of the original plan; UMT had not passed and the federal funding of new armories had not been forthcoming.

The Byrnes Committee recommended that the strength of both reserve forces be limited to 1,054,300 men. The National Guard would have 475,000 men of this total. Of the guard divisions, thirteen would be manned at 75 percent strength (those needed to support the twenty-five division plan). The remainder would be manned at 40 percent strength. The remaining 200,000 men in the guard would be divided among remaining units, and these units would be manned at

¹"The Battle of Washington . . . A Situation Report," The National Guardsman, February 1949, p. 3.

levels determined by the respective governors.¹

The ORC would have the balance of the reserve strength. The ORC units would have twice the authorized strength of officers so that more officers could receive the training and benefits inherent in unit assignments. The excess officers when recalled, would be used to fill other mobilized units or would be used as individual replacements. The twenty-five ORC divisions would be maintained in a class B status with only 10 percent of the authorized enlisted men. Nearly 400,000 men in the ORC would be in combat support units that would be mobilized to support the strike force.²

The committee recommended that the six priority guard divisions should be equally distributed among the six geographic armies located in the United States. This would distribute the burden of mobilization throughout the country in case of an emergency. The committee further recognized that the reserves could not maintain this strength without UMT and recommended that selective service be used to fill the reserves as well as the regular forces until UMT was enacted. Moreover, the army recruiting service should be tasked to recruit for the reserves.³

¹Toward Stronger Reserve Force," Army Information Digest, April 1949, pp. 52-53; "A Firm Foundation," The National Guardsman, April 1949, p. 6.

²"Toward Stronger Reserve Force," Army Information Digest, April 1949, pp. 53-54.

³Ibid.

Byrnes rejected any attempt to unify the two reserve forces. He did believe, however, that the two forces could plan for joint usage of training facilities to be more efficient. The Section Five Committee reviewed and approved the recommendations in March 1949, and this became the new operating basis of the reserve forces.¹

The new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, implemented one of the important recommendations of the Gray Board in June 1949 when he formed the Civilian Components Policy Board (CCPB). This board, composed of equal representation from the various services and reserve forces of the services would act as the secretary's advisory agency on reserve matters.² The CCPB was not designed to replace the Section Five Committee; it was designed to supplement it. The Section Five Committee had a legal basis which the CCPB did not. Secretary Johnson immediately gave the CCPB the task of studying the reserve situation in depth and developing a legislative program for Congress. Congress,

¹National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 16.

²Forrestal had resigned in March 1949 and committed suicide the following month. Johnson, a West Virginia lawyer, had been Assistant Secretary of War from 1937 through 1940 and had assisted in the development of the industrial mobilization plans for World War II. He had served as a captain in World War I and had been the National Commander of the American Legion during 1933. Johnson's performance as a fundraiser for President Truman during the 1948 presidential election was partly responsible for his nomination as Secretary of Defense. "New Head of National Military Establishment," Army Information Digest, April 1949, p. 9.

the National Guard Association, and the Reserve Officers Association, were all willing to allow the board the time to develop these plans. This package would not, however, be completely developed when the Korean War started.¹

The reserve components underwent other changes before the start of the Korean War. The training program for both the Guard and ORC changed from four to three years in order to conform with the standard enlistment. The new training program began in 1949; the units would now concentrate on training at the small unit level instead of at larger unit levels. This program was a direct result of the eighteen-division plan and the necessity to have fully trained units available earlier than previously planned.²

The National Guard continued its reorganization efforts in 1949 and 1950. It maintained its strength at the funded level by means of another national recruiting drive in late 1949. This drive put the Guard over its authorized strength of 350,000 men and the Guard spent the

¹House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, p. 12; U.S., House Congress, Armed Services Committee, Special Subcommittee on Reserve Components, Hearings on Report on Matters Affecting Civilian Components of the Armed Forces. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 4404-4407. Hereafter cited as House, Special Subcommittee Hearings.

²Col. Edward P. Mechling, "The National Guard Three-Year Program," Army Information Digest, December 1948, pp. 41-45; Col. Thomas L. Martin, "New National Guard Training Plan," Infantry Journal, September 1948, p. 32; Col. Thomas L. Martin, "Bull's Eye," The National Guardsman, August 1948, pp. 9-11.

first half of 1950 trying to get the strength down to the budgetary level. In June 1950 the Guard totalled 324,000 men.¹

The six priority divisions under the eighteen-division plan were in varying states of readiness. While guard divisions averaged 61 percent of its authorized strength, two of its priority divisions were half filled. Two of the divisions were, however, at 80 percent of their authorized strength; the other two were at the average strength for the total Guard. The divisions did have nearly all of their units organized and federally recognized; once these units received additional men, they could be ready more rapidly than a completely new division.²

The Guard continued to be plagued by the same problems during the last year before the Korean War. No new armories had been built because Congress had not appropriated money; the shortage of Regular Army instructors continued (although this situation had slowly improved until 75 percent of the slots were filled). All units were short of equipment; the entire Guard had received less than half of its authorized equipment by June 1950. There was no system of centralized accounting and control of the equipment

¹NGB (1950), pp. 4-8; MG Kenneth Cramer, "A Job Well Done," The National Guardsman, January 1950, p. 9.

²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, 1950, pp. 1030-1034.

present.¹

The Guard did benefit from the activities of the NGA. While the rest of the defense establishment had suffered budgetary cuts because of the ceilings imposed on total defense spending, the Guard's appropriations during this period had actually been increased by Congress. In 1948 it had been the only agency to have its budget increased. Generals Walsh and Reckord were largely responsible for this. One Congressman said of General Reckord, "The most powerful man I have seen in fourteen years, . . . He had tons of connections and no hesitation to use them."²

In 1948, the Guard did revamp its promotion policies which had helped retain officers and increased morale. Originally the Guard had imposed a freeze on promotions during the organization period (until 1951). This policy forced many officers out because of the maximum age-in-grade standards. Officers during this organization period could only join in their wartime grade or lower. The new promotion standards had changed to a combination of a minimum time-in-grade and the availability of an authorized slot. This enabled the Guard to retain many veterans.³

General Cramer, in early 1950, assessed the guard's

¹NGB (1950), pp. 11, 14-18.

²Derthick, pp. 72-73, 96.

³"Promotions Set Under Interim Policy," The National Guardsman, January 1948, p. 25.

potential with a caveat,

the guard is capable tomorrow, as presently constituted, organized, and equipped, of taking the field and performing very creditably any defensive mission here in the United States; also, providing the necessary covering force for the mobilization of the other elements of the Reserve.¹

In order for the Guard to perform in an offensive capability, however, Cramer stated, the units would have to be filled with their authorized equipment and men, and guaranteed that they would be permitted to train on their own, not cadred to form other divisions. If this assumption occurred, then Cramer believed that Guard divisions would be ready three or four months after mobilization to fulfill any mission given to them by the Army.²

The ORC faced many problems similar to those of the Guard but had a more difficult task to perform because of the large size of the organization. In 1948-1949 the majority of the original enlistments into the ORC had expired and the strength of it had decreased significantly. In June 1950 the ORC had numbered over 600,000 men (302,000 officers and 311,000 enlisted) down from the 746,000 men (279,000 officers, 457,000 enlisted) that composed it in June 1948.³

The Army had to overcome many obstacles before the

¹House, Defense Appropriations, 1951, p. 1036.

²Ibid.

³National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 313.

ORC could be effectively organized. The ORC still had few armories and was completely dependent on Congress for funds, unlike the Guard which received state aid. The ORC suffered from the same shortage of regular instructors that the Guard had but had little equipment available because of the Guard's priority on available equipment. The members of the ORC tended to be high-ranking because of the terminal promotion policy; the units had a severe shortage of lower-ranking officers and men. The ORC was still in direct competition with the Guard for funds, men, and equipment, and without numerous ready units, had a difficult time attracting any of these items.¹

Composite units were the most common ORC units. These units were structured geographically. The members, therefore, had little common training and lacked a sense of mission. These units had little priority on funds and equipment; most members were bored and uninterested in the reserve plan as a result. Most men in the composite units were veterans. The recent drop in the strength of the ORC was among these experienced men that the Army would need most for the next war.²

In June 1948, General Bradley directed that the

¹Gray Board, p. 109; House, Special Subcommittee Hearings, p. 4429.

²UMT Hearings 1948, p. 817. House Report, The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, pp. 14-15.

composite units be deactivated and the members assigned to either regular or common branch units. Because many ORC members were located a great distance from available training assembly points, they requested assignments in the inactive reserve, where they would have no training responsibilities until recalled. The strength of the inactive reserve rose from a few thousand in 1948 to over 100,000 in June 1950.¹

The advent of inactive training pay had been an aid to the ORC, but the number of men participating had been limited by available funds. In 1950 only 186,000 officers and men were being paid for this duty. The ORC hoped to increase this to 255,000 men in 1951, but of this number only 17,000 officers and men would be paid for duty in class A units, those equal with the Guard.²

In early 1950, the difficulties of developing an effective reserve program led to a change in the ORC structure. The ORC had authorized the formation of 18,000 units as a result of Truman's Executive Order, in an attempt to place all the men in units; some of these units now had only

¹Department of Defense Report 1950, p. 208; House, Special Subcommittee Hearings, p. 4429; Lt. E. R. Shull, "The New ORC Training Program," Army Information Digest, May 1949, pp. 56-57; BG Wendell Westover, "Organized Reserve Corps: Progress Report," Army Information Digest, October 1948, p. 60.

²Department of Defense Report, 1950, p. 208; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 384.

two or three men. The 11,000 units that had actually been formed would now be cut back to 9,000.

Major General James B. Cress, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs and principle advisor to the Chief of Staff on ORC affairs, announced the new plan. The ultimate goal of the ORC was the organization of nearly a million officers and men, one-third of which would be in the voluntary reserve (in unpaid positions) as replacements in case of an emergency. The balance would be organized into units composed of all authorized officers and half of the authorized enlisted men. Cress realized that this goal would take several years to fulfill and therefore proposed that an initial force of 225,000 men in the paid units be organized in 1951. This total would gradually increase until 1957 when the minimum goal of 367,000 men would be reached. The three categories of units would be dropped and only one type of unit--the cadre unit--would be used. The primary objective of the program was the organization of the twenty-five divisions and the necessary support units for mobilization.¹

Cress further envisioned the establishment of ORC

¹"Reserve Plan," Military Review, August 1950, p. 63; MG James B. Cress, "The New ORC Program," Army Information Digest, May 1950, pp. 11-16. After World War II Cress had been the Commander of the 80th Airborne Division of the ORC. During World War II his engineer unit had been responsible for the rehabilitation of the port of Cherbourg after the Normandy Invasion. The cost of the new program would be half of the cost of the old program.

schools around the country to give the reservists the same training that was given at the regular schools. This would be very important to the voluntary reservists. The schools would be run by reservists, whose civilian jobs were in the field of education, and would provide all the schooling needed by reservists.¹

The revised ORC was to consist of two categories of men--active and inactive. The Army planned to review the records of all ORC members and transfer those who wanted to or had not participated in training to the inactive reserve. This review was to start in July 1950.²

The reserve program had not reached fruition by 1950. Congressional committees were unhappy with the status of the ORC when compared to the Guard. Brigadier General E. A. Evans, Executive Director of the RCA, attributed the ORC problems to the lack of a comprehensive program to maintain the interest of the individual reservists.³ Brigadier General Wendell Westover, the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs in 1949, estimated it would take the ORC three to nine months after M-day to prepare for

¹CPT. Charles J. Moravac, "Allentown Schools Train Reservists," Army Information Digest, August 1950, pp. 55-58.

²MG James B. Cress, "The New ORC Program," Army Information Digest, May 1950, pp. 11-16.

³House, Special Subcommittee Hearings, p. 4406; House, Department of Defense Appropriations, 1951, p. 1088.

deployment overseas.¹ Neither reserve force was prepared for immediate deployment on the eve of Korea.

While the Regular Army had not reached its goal of 900,000 men in 1949, it had been funded for 677,000 men. At this strength the mobile reserve totaled only 155,000 men. Unfortunately the Army continued to decline in strength during the year and a half before Korea. In June 1950, the Army numbered only 591,000 men. This force was distributed worldwide in ten divisions. Only the 82nd Airborne Division, located in the United States, was immediately ready for combat. All of the other divisions had been reduced because of the austerity of Secretary Johnson; the infantry regiments were reduced from their normal three battalions to two and the artillery battalions had only two firing batteries, instead of their normal three.²

In 1950 the Army was slowly being relieved of its occupational functions as the occupied nations completed their rebuilding and the State Department began to assume political control of these nations. The division in Europe

¹House, Special Subcommittee Hearings, p. 4428.

²Department of Defense Report, July-December 1949, p. 136; James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953, Part of the Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 590; General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 373; "Distribution and Strength," Infantry Journal, April 1949, p. 37. Secretary Gray believed that the Regular Army as organized would only be effective in periods of limited combat.

and the four divisions in Japan started unit training in 1949 for the first time since the end of World War II. The effect of the vacillating manpower policies on the army had been devastating; since the end of the war, the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan had replaced its authorized strength five times in the four years. These units could not be effective under such conditions.¹

The Army did not actively recruit the one-year enlistments allowed by the Selective Service Act of 1948. These men could not be sent overseas. Moreover, the training was not cost effective. For this reason, the Army accepted less than 6 percent of the authorized 110,000 men.²

Men drafted in late 1948 were permitted to leave the Army early if they agreed to complete the remainder of their commitment in the reserves. Since the Selective Service Act was scheduled to expire in June 1950, Army leaders came forward to testify in favor of an extension. The law, they stated, was necessary not only to save mobilization time, but to demonstrate to the world the American resolve to stop aggression. Hubert Humphrey's

¹National Military Establishment, Report 1948, p. 52; Sparrow, p. 271; "Strength and Distribution," Infantry Journal, April 1949, pp. 37-38. Even at the reduced levels, General Collins claimed that the Army was in better condition because more men were in the units and they were better trained. U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Selective Service Act Extension. H. R. 6826, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, pp. 5170-5171.

²House, Selective Service Extension, 1950, p. 5135.

attempt to desegregate the military by an amendment to the act was a major obstacle in the extension of the Selective Service Act. Congress extended the law in late June 1950 for two weeks while the members tried to formulate a new act.¹

During the late 1940s the armed forces declined in strength as a result of a change in the American military policy. The United States and twelve European nations had signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Under this treaty the European nations were to provide the ground elements necessary for the defense of Europe while the United States was to provide strategic air power. At the same time, the United States had concluded military assistance agreements with other nations around the world. Under these agreements the United States provided equipment and technical knowledge to these nations to help them rebuild their armed forces. The nations located on the periphery of the communist world, Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Phillipines, Korea, and China, received over one billion dollars worth of equipment in 1949. These agreements, Secretary Johnson acknowledged,

¹Selective Service System, Selective Service Under the 1948 Act, pp. 90, 134; House, Selective Service Extension, pp. 5159, 5170, 5187; LTC Irving W. Hart, "On Extending Selective Service," Army Information Digest, May 1950, pp. 31-35; "Draft Law Still Needed," Infantry Journal, December 1949, p. 31. Because the Selective Service Act required registration regardless of the number of men inducted, the system had a pool of 1.5 million men classified as I-A, available for service, in June 1950.

hindered the efforts to rebuild the American Armed Forces.¹

Several events during 1949-1950 changed the assumptions of the American military policy. Russia exploded a nuclear weapon in September 1949, erasing the American monopoly on the weapon. Additionally, Mao took control of mainland China in 1949 and later signed a mutual defense agreement with Russia. At the same time, Secretary Johnson continued to pare the defense budget with President Truman's approval. The defense budget dropped from the ceiling of \$15 billion imposed by Truman, to \$13 billion in 1950. Johnson claimed that the country was receiving more defense with this lower expenditure because waste and inefficiency were being cut. The real impact of these cuts on the army mobilization structure would, however, be obvious during the Korean War.²

Johnson's authority as Secretary of Defense changed with an amendment of the National Security Act in 1949. The defense secretary now had full authority over the three services; the services' leaders could no longer publicly

¹"Toward World Stability," Army Information Digest, December 1949, pp. 12-27; General Omar Bradley, "New Strength to Old World Ramparts," Army Information Digest, May 1949, pp. 3-5; Louis Johnson, "Military Assistance for Mutual Security," Army Information Digest, September 1949, pp. 3-6; General Omar Bradley, "The Strategy of MAP," Army Information Digest, September 1949, pp. 9-10.

²Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: Norton, 1971), p. 13; COL Charles H. Donnelly, "Evolution of United States Military Strategic Thought," Military Review, October 1959, p. 16.

circumvent him. In addition, the JCS received a nonvoting chairman; President Truman named General Bradley as the first chairman with General Collins taking his place as the Army Chief of Staff.¹

During this time the State Department became concerned with the readiness state of the military forces in light of the deteriorating world situation. The State Department developed the National Security Council Memo-68 in early 1950 to determine the proper American military posture in the current world situation. The Department concluded that the United States needed to embark immediately on a military rebuilding program to face any Soviet threat that might arise in the next three to four years (when Russia would fully develop a nuclear capability). Moreover, the American defense policy should not be based only on planning for a total war; the country had to be prepared to fight minor wars that would not involve nuclear weapons as well. The State Department Memo recommended a budget of \$17 to \$18 billion for the next year in order to start this program. President Truman approved the principles of the plan in April 1950, but the Korean War started before the plan could be fully developed.²

¹"National Security Act Amended," Army Information Digest, September 1949, pp. 59-60.

²Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 24, 48-52. The full cost of the program outlined in NSC-68 would be \$35 billion. For a detailed analysis of NSC-68 see Paul Y. Hammonds,

President Truman was satisfied with the military capabilities of the United States in 1950. He believed that the armed forces were now in balance and that the proposed military budget

provides for active forces in a high state of training, available for immediate use if necessary and a nucleus for rapid expansion in the event of an emergency, and for reserve forces, organized and trained for early mobilization, if necessary. . . .¹

The services had stressed the development of the active units necessary for short conflicts. Budget limitations had, however, hindered the development of the mobilization base units necessary for long wars. The Korean War was, unfortunately, a long war.

"NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament," contained in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

¹"Budget Requirements for National Defense, Army Information Digest, February 1950, p. 57.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUICK FIX: THE ARMY MOBILIZATION FOR THE KOREAN WAR

The North Korean Army invaded South Korea early in the morning of 24 June 1950. The North's modern army of 200,000 men was organized into eight divisions with a large number of artillery pieces and tanks. The South Korean Army of 96,000 men had been organized and trained by the United States after World War II but had no tanks and little artillery in their four organized divisions.¹

Korea's problems dated from the nineteenth century. Japan had gained control of the Korean Peninsula after their successful wars with Russia and China in the late nineteenth century. By 1910 she had annexed the Korean nation and maintained control over Korea until the end of World War II. As part of the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the Allies pledged to help make Korea free after the war. The United States and Russia occupied the country in September 1945, dividing their zones along the 38th parallel. They were to disarm the Japanese Army located in Korea and help the Koreans develop an independent government after the

¹Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History, part of Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 545.

lengthy control by the Japanese.¹

The American commander in Korea, Lieutenant General John Hodges, was unable to gain the Russians' cooperation in establishing a joint government. The foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, Britain, and China, therefore established a four-power commission on Korea in accordance with a declaration they signed in Moscow in December 1945. The four-power commission failed to unify the nation. The United Nations next attempted to conduct an election in 1948 and failed. Later that year, however, the South conducted its own election, and the government of South Korea came into being.²

The Russians soon held elections in the North and established a rival government. After the two governments were established in late 1948, the Russians withdrew their army from the peninsula. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended that the American forces be withdrawn in late 1947 when the United Nations assumed responsibility for Korea. The two divisions in Korea represented one-fifth of the available American ground units, and the Chiefs felt that these units could be employed elsewhere more profitably.

¹Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25 Year Perspective (Lawrence, KS: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), pp. xvii-xix; "Background on Korea," Army Information Digest, August 1950, pp. 10-17.

²The United States military government of South Korea ended after the establishment of the South Korean government.

The withdrawal was completed in July 1949.¹

After the American Army left, South Korean President Syngmen Rhee stated that his army was "rapidly approaching the point at which our security can be assured, providing the Republic of Korea is not called upon to face attack from a foreign source."² The United States left a 500-man advisory force in South Korea to help develop its army. In the era of small American defense budgets, the United States could not provide much equipment. Once the American Army had withdrawn from Korea, General MacArthur had no responsibility to defend the area. The American position on Korea and Formosa was made clear by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech in January 1950.

Should such an attack occur [on Korea or Formosa]--one hesitates to say where such an armed attack could come from--the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations. . . .³

The American response to the attack on South Korea did follow the policy espoused by Secretary Acheson. The first American action was to inform the United Nations of

¹General Douglas MacArthur was a key figure in the conduct of the Korean War. He graduated first in the class of 1903 at West Point and rose rapidly in the rank, becoming a brigadier general during the First World War. He was the Army Chief of Staff during the early 1930s. President Roosevelt recalled him to active duty during World War II; he later accepted the surrender of the Japanese. He directed the occupation of Japan and the political transformation of that nation after the war.

²Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 90.

³Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, ed., The Truman Administration: A Documentary History (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 430-436.

the incident and request an emergency session of the Security Council. At the same time, President Truman authorized General MacArthur to send supplies and arms from Japan to South Korea. The United Nations adopted a resolution on 25 June calling for a cease fire, withdrawal of military units to the original boundary, and assistance by other nations in executing the resolution.¹

As the South continued to retreat, President Truman realized that he had to take stronger actions. After consulting with his advisors on the 27th, he authorized General MacArthur to support the South Koreans with air and seapower. In addition, he ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits to prevent spread of the war to Formosa. Because of the fear of the involvement of Communist China, on 29 June, Truman rejected the offer of Chiang Kai Shek, to provide 30,000 Nationalist Chinese troops for the South Korean effort. Truman felt such an act would provoke the Chinese Communists.²

The failure of the North Koreans to respond to the first United Nations resolution led to a second session of the organization on 27 June. The United Nations declared the North Koreans the aggressor and requested that the members

¹U.S. Defense Department, "Our Stand in Korea," Armed Forces Talk #334, pp. 7-8.

²"The President's Stand on Korea," Army Information Digest, August 1950, p. 5. Hereafter cited as "President's Stand."

provide military assistance to the South. In addition, on 7 July the United Nations asked President Truman to name a commander of the international military effort. Truman immediately made General MacArthur the commander. The American military action in Korea was, therefore, conducted under the authority of the United Nations as part of an international effort.¹

President Truman believed that the response to aggression in Korea had to be swift and forceful. The appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s in Europe was fresh in Truman's mind. This time he would not permit appeasement of an enemy. He felt that the United States had finally learned the lesson of history. Truman made his rationale clear in his speech before Congress on 19 July 1950 when he requested a supplemental appropriation of \$10 billion for the military:

It should be made perfectly clear that [our] action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle. The United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force.

The attack on the Republic of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international communist movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must therefore recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas. . . . The free world has made it clear through the United Nations, that lawless aggression will be met with force.²

¹Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defense Policies Since World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 27.

²"President's Stand," pp. 2-3.

While President Truman desired to meet force with force, he could do little without either a declaration of war or a national emergency. He did neither initially and declared a national emergency only after the Communist Chinese entered the war in December 1950. Truman therefore needed congressional approval to recall reserve units and to spend more money to support a larger American military presence in Korea. The years of austere defense budgets had left the military forces in a poor position to fight a war such as Korea.

Based on General MacArthur's personal assessment of the military situation on 29 June, Truman authorized the deployment of ground forces to Korea on 30 June 1950. One regimental combat team was to be deployed immediately as the lead element of a two-division force.¹

General MacArthur's Far East Command was in its worst condition since the end of World War II. Four divisions were located in Japan and one Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in Okinawa. These divisions had demobilized their medium tank battalions because they were too heavy for the Japanese bridges. The divisions had an authorized wartime strength of nearly 19,000 men, yet in June 1950 they had only two-thirds of their authorized men.² Manpower cuts had forced

¹Ibid., pp. 3-9.

²The following units (and their strengths) were located in Japan: 7th Infantry Division (12,907), 24th Infantry Division (12,197), 25th Infantry Division (15,018), and the

MacArthur to reduce his infantry regiments to two battalions instead of the authorized three and the artillery battalions to two batteries instead of the usual three. This meant that the commanders would be unable to maintain reserve units and could not rotate units out of the front line to give them a rest.

The 24th Division was located nearest the Korean Peninsula and could arrive the soonest. By using the 7th Division to provide replacements for the 24th, the 24th arrived in Korea with nearly 16,000 men.¹ The 24th organized a regimental combat team, named Task Force Smith after its commander, and deployed it to Korea on 30 June. The remainder of the division arrived by 5 July.

General MacArthur had estimated that two divisions would be required in Korea, but he revised his estimate when the situation deteriorated rapidly in early July. On 7 July he requested four divisions, one airborne RCT, one armored group of three medium tank battalions, and the necessary artillery and support units from the United States. In addition, he asked for 30,000 men to bring the units in Japan to full strength. He had already ordered the 25th Division to Korea; it would arrive by 14 July. The 1st

1st Cavalry Division (organized as an infantry division--12,340). A full strength division contained nearly 19,000 men.

¹Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, part of the History of the United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 59.

Cavalry Division followed shortly thereafter, landing in Korea on 18 July. This was the last ready division MacArthur had available for deployment to Korea.¹

MacArthur's needs could only be met by the deployment of units from the general reserve in the United States. Although the Army had six other divisions, only one was considered ready for deployment.²

Congress provided the Army with some relief from its manpower troubles in July when it extended enlistments for one year. Major General C. E. Byers of the army staff estimated that this law prevented the loss of 145,000 men including 44,000 in MacArthur's command. At the same time the Army stopped accepting resignations of officers and announced that all officers would remain on active duty as long as necessary. Although the Selective Service Act had been extended in early July, General Byers stressed that inductees would not be available for several months. The men on active duty were the only available source of trained manpower.³

¹James F. Schabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, part of the History of the United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 83-85.

²The Army had two infantry divisions, one and two-thirds airborne divisions, one armored division in the United States as well as a regimental combat team and an armored cavalry regiment. In Europe there was one infantry division, one regimental combat team, three armored cavalry regiments, and one separate infantry regiment. Hawaii had one regimental combat team; the Caribbean had two. Schabel, pp. 42-45.

³U.S. Congress, House, Armed Services Committee,

The general reserve had to be used to fill the immediate needs of the Far East. On 8 July MacArthur requested specific units to round out his units. He needed eleven infantry battalions, eleven artillery battalions, four medium tank battalions, and twelve light tank companies, all at full strength. At this time there were only eighteen infantry battalions available in the general reserve. The Joint Chiefs sent MacArthur eight full and three cadre battalions of the units from the United States, Hawaii, and Okinawa. Only the 82nd Airborne Division and the 2nd Armored Division had no units deployed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the 82nd was untouched because it was the only fully trained division remaining in the United States and the armored division was still intact because it was not suited for combat in Korea. The number of artillery battalions in the United States was reduced by one-third in order to fill the needs of the Far East.¹

Other losses in the general reserve reduced the ability of the United States to react to other potential emergencies in July. MacArthur received an airborne RCT from the 11th Airborne Divisions; the two regiments of division had to be combined to supply one full RCT.²

Full Committee Hearing on H.R. 9177 to Authorize the President to Extend Enlistments in the Armed Forces of the United States. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, pp. 6786-6791. Hereafter cited as Hearings to Extend Enlistments.

¹Schabel, pp. 90-91.

²Ibid., pp. 92-97.

MacArthur had specifically requested the deployment of the 2nd Infantry Division to Korea. General Mark Clark, the Commander of the Army Field Forces, estimated that it would take four months to train the 2nd Infantry Division adequately after it received the 5,000 men needed to fill it completely. Within less than six weeks, however, the entire division was in combat.

MacArthur's request for 15 nondivisional artillery battalions and 200 support units could not be met by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the general reserve had been stripped of units to supply the other needs. By the end of July, the general reserve in the United States had dropped from 140,000 men to 90,000 men. Of the remaining men, 15,000 were necessary for the operation of the posts and training bases and could not be deployed without closing these bases. MacArthur had been promised half of the balance. The available reserve of the United States Army consisted of one division--the 82nd Airborne Division. Several other divisions and RCTs were at cadre strength. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a year would be necessary to bring the general reserve back to an acceptable level of readiness. For this reason, MacArthur's request on 21 July for another army of four divisions with all supporting troops was not favorably considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They first had to decide how the general reserve was to be rebuilt.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 96-119.

The reduction in the active army had other repercussions. The number of men available to train reservists and inductees had been reduced. An increase in the size of the Army would be limited by the available training facilities to prepare recruits for combat in Korea. The initial inductions under the Selective Service Act would have to be small in comparison to the number of reservists called. The Army simply did not have the men, equipment, or facilities available to train the new recruits. The first burden of the mobilization fell on the regular forces; unfortunately this meant that by using them first, the Army would not have enough men to carry out its subsequent mobilization program. The Army general reserve and part of its mobilization base was the price of supporting MacArthur.

As always, it may be difficult to determine who are the principal decision makers. The main leadership positions in the Defense Department during the first year of the war were unusually experienced soldiers from World War II. Generals Bradley and Collins were to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army Chief of Staff respectively, during the war. The Army Vice Chief of Staff was General Wade Haislip.¹ The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans was Lieutenant General Alfred M. Gruenther, who had

¹Haislip, a West Point graduate, had commanded a division, corps, and an army during World War II.

been the first Director of the Joint Staff in 1947. He would later be named Supreme Commander of the forces in Europe. Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway was the Deputy Chief of Staff of Administration. Ridgway, a classmate of General Collins, gained fame as the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division during World War II. He would replace Lieutenant General Walton Walker as the commander of the ground forces in Korea upon the latter's death in December 1950. Ridgway would replace General MacArthur when President Truman relieved him in early 1951. He would later be the Commander of NATO forces and the Army Chief of Staff.¹

In September Secretary of Defense Johnson resigned. He had been severely criticized for the lack of readiness of the armed forces for the Korean War. Truman nominated General George Marshall as the new Defense Secretary.² Marshall immediately named his friend Anna Rosenberg to become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, a position he had created because of the troubles during the first months of the Korean War. Once in office, Secretary Rosenberg approved all manpower policies personally. Marshall

¹Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy, Register of Graduates and Former Cadets (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley, 1978, p. 331.

²Marshall had been the Army Chief of Staff during World War II and the Secretary of State afterward. He was the President of the American Red Cross when Truman recalled him. Marshall had to receive special congressional permission to become the Secretary of Defense because of the restrictions in the 1947 National Defense Act on military officers becoming the secretary.

also nominated Robert A. Lovell as the Under Secretary of Defense. Lovell, who would succeed Marshall as Defense Secretary, had been Under Secretary of State when Marshall was Secretary of State.¹

President Truman needed congressional authority before he could recall the reserves. He received this authority as part of the extension of the Selective Service Act, which Congress passed on 9 July 1950. Section 21 of the law authorized the President,

[to] order into active military or naval service of the United States for a period not to exceed twenty-one consecutive months, with or without their consent, any or all members and units of any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States and retired personnel of the Regular Armed Forces.²

Congress granted this authority for only a year. Truman announced on 19 July that he was delegating authority to recall reserve units of the National Guard and units and men of the Organized Reserves to Secretary of Defense Johnson.³

¹Rosenberg was a naturalized citizen, having been born in Hungary. She quickly established herself as a labor relations expert and worked with Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt in the New York government. When he became President, he appointed her to several federal positions. During World War II she served on the War Manpower Commission, the agency that coordinated the distribution of manpower between the military and industry. After the war she was President Roosevelt's personal representative to handle veteran affairs. She was confirmed by the Senate for the defense position only after a lengthy debate over her political affiliations, led by Senator Joseph McCarthy. Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1951), pp. 538-540.

²"Washington Report," The National Guardsman, August 1950, p. 3.

³Ibid.

General Collins did not desire to federalize the National Guard. Federalization was a politically sensitive decision because of the dual role of the Guard. Moreover, the Army Staff did not have a clear idea of the manpower needs for the Korean War. The Guard had traditionally been used only in full mobilization; to take units selectively would place an uneven burden on parts of the country. This could have a harmful effect on the economy; economic mobilization was initially as important as manpower mobilization. The rapid advance of the North Korean army made the point moot by late July. On 10 August President Truman approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation to federalize Guard divisions, with the first federalization scheduled for 1 September.¹

Collins had approved federalization of four infantry divisions and two RCTs. General Mark Clark, Commander of the Army Field Forces which were responsible for training the Guard, recommended that the Army call any of the following divisions: 28th (Pennsylvania), 29th (Virginia-Maryland), 31st (Mississippi-Alabama), 37th (Ohio), 45th (Oklahoma) Infantry, and the 50th (New Jersey) Armored Divisions. Clark stated that these were the best trained,

¹Schabel, pp. 122-124. Some nondivisional units of the Guard had been alerted and federalized in late July. Only ninety-two units and 10,000 men were part of this early mobilization. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, The Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1951. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 41.

equipped and most ready units.¹

The units selected by General Clark were not approved by the army staff. The units were not evenly distributed geographically; most were located on the eastern section of the country and would require considerable time to move to the west coast. These units would aggravate the already serious transportation problem. Clark revised his list by dropping the 50th Armored Division and adding the 40th (California) Infantry Division. Only three of the divisions under the "Eighteen Division" Plan had been included on the two lists of units.²

The units alerted for federalization varied somewhat from the two recommendations. The 28th, 40th, and 45th Divisions were selected from the revised list along with the 43rd Infantry Division. General Cramer, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, had commanded this unit before transferring to the National Guard Bureau. He resigned from the NGB to return to command of his division. In addition, the 196th (South Dakota) and 278th (Tennessee) RCTs were alerted to complete the first call. The units had been geographically distributed; one had been selected from each of the geographic armies in the United States.³

¹Schabel, p. 124.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 124-125. Major General Daniel Strickler, Commanding General of the 28th Division, had to resign as Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania in order to mobilize with his unit. "Washington Report," The National Guardsman, September 1950, p. 2.

The Guard units had been formally alerted on 31 July 1950, and they would be federalized on 1 September. The units would spend August preparing for federalization. At the time of the alert the divisions were in their annual summer camp, and mobilization was, therefore, not difficult. The Guard units which had been alerted quickly found that the recommendation of the Gray Board concerning standardization of administrative procedures had not been fully implemented. Finance forms, property books, and personnel forms all differed from the ones used by the Guard. The Army failed to notify the units of the changes it wanted them to make in their organization until mobilization began. The 40th Division received orders to make these changes three weeks after federalization.¹

The units recruited more men during August, and some of the smaller units did increase their strength. Guardsmen were still, however, under control of the states, and state adjutants general had authority to release individuals from their service obligation anytime before the federalization date. Many men in critical occupations or with several dependents were released in this manner.²

General Clark did not expect to begin the training

¹"M-Day . . . The Reality," The National Guardsman, February 1951, p. 2.

²National Guard Association of the United States, Official Proceedings of the National Guard Association of the United States (Washington, D.C.: National Guard Association, 1950), pp. 111-112. Hereafter cited as Proceedings, 1950.

program for the guard units until November. The units would need time to move to their training camps. Moreover, the divisions needed 7,000 to 9,000 inductees to complete their organization before they could commence training. The first inductions under the Selective Service Act would not begin until September. Clark thought that the guard units would not be ready for deployment until April 1951.¹

The guard units were to undergo a training program lasting seven months. Because the units included many recruits they had to begin training with the basic training of these individuals. The Army did not have the facilities to train these men before sending them to the guard units. During this time other members of the guard divisions were to attend army service schools. The Army would assist these units, however, in the training sequence by sending training teams from service schools to teach the units effective training methods. The guard units could not be ready for combat until nine months after M-day. They, therefore, were not part of the immediate reaction force they did, however, constitute a part of the general reserve and were generally in better condition than the few remaining regular units, except for the 82nd Airborne Division.²

¹Schabel, p. 124.

²COL. T. G. Rickey, "What Lies Ahead?" The National Guardsman, October 1950, pp. 18-20; GEN. Jacob L. Devers, "AFF Makes Its Postwar Report," Army Information Digest, December 1949, pp. 26-28.

The Army was also short of equipment. In the first year of the war, the Guard transferred nearly \$200 million worth of equipment to the Regular Army, and the amount of equipment on hand in the nonfederalized guard units declined to 33 percent. The new Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Major General Raymond Fleming, noted that "Although losses resulted in limitations, the training program was not hampered critically."¹ The Guard also transferred 5,600 vehicles and 750 tanks during the first year, and equipment had to be transferred between the guard units so that all would have the minimum necessary for training.²

The National Guard Association did not support the change in their status as the first reserve force. General Walsh feared that the presidential authority to call reservists and guardsmen individually would be used to destroy the units. In July he believed that the war could be fought without federalization and gained assurances from General Louis Hershey that guardsmen would continue to be deferred from selective service. Once President Truman approved the federalization of the Guard, however, Walsh proposed that the Army mobilize the entire guard so that the burden of defense would be equitably shared by all.³

¹NGB (1951), p. 22.

²Ibid.

³MG Ellard Walsh, "The President's Page," The National Guardsman, August 1950, inside front page; Proceedings, 1950, pp. 73-74, 216-219.

The critical need of the Far East Command was trained men. The Regular Army had provided the men for expansion in the early days of the conflict, but, by September, this pool had been exhausted. The members of the ORC were the only available supply of trained men. Most of the members were veterans of World War II and could be trained quickly since most units were still equipped with weapons from World War II. MacArthur's command needed 82,500 individual replacements by September if all the units were to be filled to wartime strength. Unfortunately, only 7,350 men reached the Far East in July, and most of these men were assigned to headquarters units. In July President Truman approved the call up of Army reservists.¹

The Army initially asked members of the ORC volunteer for active duty. One-third of the ORC officers had previously desired to return to active duty when the plan for expansion of the Regular Army was announced in 1948. Unfortunately, most of these officers had changed their minds by the time of the emergency of July 1950. The response to the Army's request was so poor that in mid-August the Army began to recall members of the ORC involuntarily. The first call was for nearly 8,000 company grade officers and 1,500 medical doctors. The officers were told to report to their assigned posts by early October; all would have at least one month to prepare for service. Most officers were lieutenants

¹Schabel, pp. 87-88, 129.

assigned to the combat arms, especially those in the infantry and engineers. None of the officers were, however, assigned to active ORC units. These units had to be maintained intact for other potential emergencies. The Army also notified 62,000 enlisted members of the ORC that they would be recalled involuntarily to fill active units. All would have to serve twenty-one months.¹

Shortly after the first ORC recalls, the Army notified 42,000 additional enlisted men to report for service by the end of October. Moreover, the Army planned to recall reservists who joined under the one-year training program in 1948-1949. This affected 4,000 more enlisted men. The Army extended the recall program for officers in November, recalling nearly 9,700 more lieutenants and captains. The second officer recall was larger than the first because of problems with the first group of officers; many had requested exemptions because of occupations. For example, most agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation were also reserve officers. This presented a dilemma; men in such critical occupations could not be replaced immediately.²

¹"Billions More Asked; Involuntary Recalls," Army Navy Journal, 12 August 1950, pp. 1349, 1369; "Army Officer Recall," Army Navy Journal, 12 August 1950, p. 1351; "Building Our Military Manpower," Army Information Digest, September 1950, pp. 7-8. The first reservists recalled were those who were eligible for induction.

²"Call Army Reserve," Army Navy Journal, August 26, 1950, p. 1399; "Reserve Corps Prospectus," Army Navy Journal, 23 September 1950, p. 94; "Army Calls More Reserves," Army Navy Journal, 23 September 1950, p. 111.

The recall of members of the ORC did not proceed smoothly since the Army had to maintain the units of the ORC in case of other emergencies. Most of those recalled were not members of active units. They were either in the inactive portion of the ORC or had not recently participated in training and would have been transferred to the inactive section when the records review started in July. In addition, most of those recalled had received a terminal promotion at the end of World War II. Many of the officers on active duty, however, had not been promoted since then. The reserve officers who had gone on active duty voluntarily since World War II had to revert to their pretermination grade before coming on active duty. The involuntarily recalled members of the ORC reported to the active army in their termination grade. These officers, who had not participated in training programs since termination, outranked their World War II contemporaries who had been in such programs.¹

The ORC members were recalled based on the occupation specialty they held during their previous military service. Many were placed in positions in which they had not served for five years. In many cases they had received extensive training in other occupations that the Army needed, but the Army simply did not know what training these men had received.²

¹"Expand U.S. Services," Army Navy Journal, 15 July 1950, p. 1267.

²U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reserve Components. H. R. 4860, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1951, pp. 508. Hereafter cited as Reserve Components.

General Bradley, in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in July, delineated the three manpower needs of the military. The primary need was for trained men to deploy to the Far East. In addition, the armed forces had to replace the Regular Army personnel and units sent to Korea in order to reestablish the general reserve. Finally, the armed forces had to be expanded to provide a force sufficiently flexible to meet other emergencies. The trained manpower of the regulars and the reserves had filled the immediate needs of Korea. The military required a long-term solution, however, to complete other needs. The Selective Service System would provide an interim solution for the other needs.¹

President Truman authorized General Hershey to expand the Selective Service System in early July in order to induct men in September. Hershey planned to induct 170,000 men during the first three months. He exceeded this total by 10,000 men. Fortunately, Hershey had a pool of 1.5 million men already classified as available for service.²

The inductions had been limited by the availability of training camps and equipment. The Army had reduced the number of training camps to four; after the war started the

¹"The Path Ahead," Army Information Digest, October 1950, pp. 24-26.

²U.S. Selective Service System, Selective Service Under the 1948 Act 24 June 1948-9 July 1950, p. 37. Hershey had been with the Selective Service System since 1936 and had been the director during World War II.

number had been increased to eight.¹ The additional camps would not be ready for several months, partly because the regular officers and men needed to run them were in Korea as replacements.

The Selective Service Act permitted numerous exemptions. The largest categories were veterans of World War II, fathers, and those over twenty-six. During the first year of the war over twelve million men registered for induction. Of this group over half were exempted. Another million were physically or mentally disqualified for service. The Selective Service System's pool of men available for service remained at 200,000 men a month. Hershey requested induction of 550,000 men during the first year of the war and got nearly 590,000 men.²

Selective service had maintained a small reserve pool of men ready for induction during this period while UMT was an early casualty. The Army did not have the men to conduct UMT, though it was still perceived as the permanent solution to the manpower needs.

The men inducted under the Selective Service Act would not be available for deployment overseas until the

¹"Building Our Military Manpower," Army Information Digest, September 1950, p. 7.

²U.S. Selective Service System, Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, Fiscal year 1951, p. 14; U.S., Office of Secretary of Defense, Director for Statistical Services, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 50.

spring of 1951. They had to undergo basic training first. Including the time needed for administrative functions and the movement overseas, it took six months for the Army to provide a trained replacement. General MacArthur continued to have a critical need for trained replacements when the first men were inducted.¹

MacArthur meanwhile was planning a surprise landing at Inchon behind the North Korean lines. This action, he believed, would stop their offensive. The terrain and hydrostatic conditions at Inchon were very difficult, and consequently, the Joint Chiefs did not initially approve the plan. MacArthur eventually received authority to execute the operation in mid-September, but the Joint Chiefs failed to send him the replacements that he needed for the landing. The 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division were to be the assault units; most of the men in the 1st Marine Division had been reservists a few weeks before the landing when they were recalled as part of the Marine Corps mobilization.²

In an effort to solve the manpower problem, the Joint Chiefs, in August, authorized MacArthur to incorporate

¹Ray Lapica, ed., Facts on File Yearbook (New York: Facts on File, 1950), p. 268; Hearings to Extend Enlistments, pp. 6786-6787. General Clark cut the length of basic training in August from fourteen to six weeks to make more men available for deployment.

²Schabel, pp. 165-170.

native Koreans into his American divisions to bring them up to effective strength. The 7th Division had priority on the replacements arriving in August. This priority did not, however, bring the division to full strength; the levies on the division to fill other units had rendered it ineffective. Later that month, the division began receiving the Koreans, most of whom did not speak English or have any formal military training. Over 8,000 Koreans were assigned to the division, and they composed almost half of the division's strength when it landed at Inchon in September.¹

The 7th Division was not the only American unit to receive the Koreans; all the divisions did. In the other divisions, however, the Koreans composed only 20 percent of the unit. MacArthur's gamble at Inchon was successful; it stopped the North Korean offensive. He had succeeded with a narrow margin in manpower that had been aided by the use of native Koreans.²

The Inchon Landing marked a change in American military policy. The following month the United Nations authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea and to reunite the nation of Korea. The crisis of Korea appeared to be ending. General Bradley's first priority with manpower now shifted to the development of a permanent

¹Schabel, pp. 165-170; Appleman, pp. 605-606.

²"Prepare for 10 Years of Tension," U.S. News and World Report, 13 April 1951, pp. 24-31; Facts on File, 1950, p. 323.

native Koreans into his American divisions to bring them up to effective strength. The 7th Division had priority on the replacements arriving in August. This priority did not, however, bring the division to full strength; the levies on the division to fill other units had rendered it ineffective. Later that month, the division began receiving the Koreans, most of whom did not speak English or have any formal military training. Over 8,000 Koreans were assigned to the division, and they composed almost half of the division's strength when it landed at Inchon in September.¹

The 7th Division was not the only American unit to receive the Koreans; all the divisions did. In the other divisions, however, the Koreans composed only 20 percent of the unit. MacArthur's gamble at Inchon was successful; it stopped the North Korean offensive. He had succeeded with a narrow margin in manpower that had been aided by the use of native Koreans.²

The Inchon Landing marked a change in American military policy. The following month the United Nations authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel into North Korea and to reunite the nation of Korea. The crisis of Korea appeared to be ending. General Bradley's first priority with manpower now shifted to the development of a permanent

¹Schabel, pp. 165-170; Appleman, pp. 605-606.

²"Prepare for 10 Years of Tension," U.S. News and World Report, 13 April 1951, pp. 24-31; Facts on File, 1950, p. 323.

military force that could respond to emergencies anywhere in the world, especially with the defense of Europe.¹

Although the Far East received several units in September, they had started deployment before the Inchon landing. MacArthur received an airborne RCT and the 3rd Infantry Division in September. Only two of the regiments of the 3rd Division had deployed; the 65th RCT, located in Puerto Rico, completed the division organization. The 3rd Division was to be used only for the defense of Japan.²

In October at the Wake Island Conference, General Bradley told MacArthur that the Joint Chiefs planned to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd Divisions from Korea as soon as the war ended. They would redeploy to Europe. MacArthur had no objections; he expected the war to end by December anyway. MacArthur stated that he intended to withdraw all American units to Japan at the end of the war. He felt that the presence of combat units in Japan had hindered the occupation in Japan. He therefore recommended that the occupation of Korea be conducted by the United Nations and the State Department.³

¹Schabel, pp. 221-255; General of the Army Omar Bradley, "U.S. Military Policy 1950," U.S. Army Combat Forces Journal, October 1950, p. 8. Bradley noted that Korea no longer had first class strategic value for the United States.

²Schabel, p. 131.

³Ibid., pp. 212-224. U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference, prepared by General of the Army Omar Bradley, 1951, pp. 1-6. Hereafter cited as Wake Island.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been aware of the threats of the Communist Chinese to intervene in Korea if the United Nations forces moved into North Korea. General MacArthur had assured the President at Wake Island that he did not consider the Chinese to be a serious threat and had not detected any Chinese troop movement. The Chinese, already known to be in Korea, were disregarded as advisors. It was only when the Chinese began their offensive in late November with an army of over 200,000 men that MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs realized that the war had changed.¹

In November the Army still had only one trained division in the United States, the 82nd Airborne. This division would require over a month to deploy to Korea. The four guard divisions were not scheduled to finish training until June 1951, although they could be sent in April, if necessary. These divisions contained most of the early inductees. The other three regular divisions in the United States were still in the process of activation and would not be available until August.²

MacArthur's immediate need in November was again for replacements; he requested 74,000 men. The army staff sent him two-thirds of the 33,000 men in the regular divisions located in the United States. The Joint Chiefs gave MacArthur

¹Wake Island, pp. 1-5.

²Schabel, p. 294.

the authority to deploy the 3rd Infantry Division from Japan to Korea in November. This again left Japan without ground forces.¹

President Truman declared a National Emergency in mid-December because of the Chinese invasion of Korea. He also announced federalization of two more guard divisions and one regimental combat team. The Defense Department announced that the units selected were the 31st (Alabama-Mississippi), 47th (Minnesota) Infantry Divisions, and the 296th RCT (Puerto Rico).² In the same declaration Truman announced plans to increase the size of the armed forces to 3.5 million men; it had numbered only 1.5 million in June 1950.

The Army's manpower shortage continued into January 1951 as more men were deployed to Korea. The National Guard divisions were the only available source of trained men. The army staff decided in early 1951 to levy men from these divisions for replacements. The largest levy--14,300 men--was taken in February 1951. These men were to replace the Koreans in the American Units, not to form additional divisions. The Army was careful, however, to levy only the men who were inducted into the service and were subsequently

¹Ibid., pp. 294-299.

²NGB, 1951, p. 11; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951, 1950, p. 1034. The 296th Regiment was at full authorized strength; the 31st Division was two-thirds complete and the 47th Division was half full. Facts on File, 1950, p. 408.

assigned to the guard divisions. The levies hindered the guard's effort to complete their training, but did not, according to Major General Daniel H. Hudelson of the 40th Division, upset the tactical integrity of that division. The division soon received additional untrained replacements.¹

The Joint Chiefs in January considered withdrawal of all forces from the Korean Peninsula if the forces already there could not contain the Chinese attack. General Collins visited Korea that month. He convinced himself that the United Nations forces could maintain their position and recommended that the number of men in Korea be limited so that the Army could rebuild the general reserve.²

Because General MacArthur had deployed the 3rd Division to Korea and had left Japan without defenses, the Joint Chiefs decided to deploy two of the guard divisions. The 40th and 45th Divisions were sent to Japan in April but only to provide for defense of that nation. MacArthur had asked for all the guard divisions for the defense of Japan. These two divisions would, however, later be moved to Korea in December 1951 and January 1952 to relieve the hard pressed divisions located there. They were the only

¹"Washington Report," The National Guardsman, March 1951, p. 12; Schnabel, p. 343; "Special Troop Levy," Army Navy Journal, 17 February 1951, p. 660. No guard division lost more than 20 percent of its total strength.

²Arthur M. Schlesinger and Roger Burns, ed., Congress Investigates 1792-1974 (New York: Chelsea House, 1975), pp. 3651, 3698.

guard divisions to be assigned to Korea.¹

The Army continued to recall members of the ORC. Another 7,500 officers were recalled in December. The army staff did establish a priority of recall; volunteers would be the first accepted, and second priority went to those officers with less than two years of service who attended the ROTC program and had a selective service deferment. The next priority was ROTC graduates without draft deferments. Members of the voluntary reserve were to be recalled last. No officer with four or more dependents would be recalled unless he volunteered. The recall program continued throughout 1951, with over 40,000 officers reporting by June 1951.²

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs developed plans to strengthen NATO defenses. President Truman in early 1951 recalled General Eisenhower to active duty and appointed him as the Supreme Commander of the NATO forces. The Army planned to deploy four divisions to Europe in 1951 as the American contribution to NATO. The two remaining National Guard divisions--the 28th and 43rd--were to be part of this force. These units were alerted for movement in July and arrived in Europe in November. At the same time, the 196th and 278th RCTs deployed to Alaska and Iceland, respectively.³

¹Schabel, pp. 344-345.

²"Army Issues Calls, New Promotions Seen," Army Navy Journal, 28 February 1951, p. 748. All men recalled had to serve twenty-one months.

³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Assignment of Ground Forces of the

General Eisenhower believed that Europe needed a total of forty divisions as an initial defense force. The United States had the equivalent of two divisions in Europe in 1950 on occupational duty. Although the total American ground commitment to Europe would be small, six divisions, Secretary Marshall believed that it would be a catalyst to develop an effective defensive force by the Europeans. The American commitment of air and sea power would, however, be greater. The United States would continue to provide the strategic forces for NATO.¹

General Bradley believed this strategy to be correct. The ground forces would help provide time for the American military and industry to mobilize, time the allied nations had provided in the last two wars. This strategy would improve the overall defensive posture of the United States and Western Europe. Bradley stated that it would be better to fight the next war on European rather than American soil.²

The Army faced another mobilization problem in early 1951--the release of the involuntarily recalled reservists. The Army now had three manpower missions: to support

United States to Duty in the European Area, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, p. 40. Facts on File, 1951, p. 220.

¹Ibid., pp. 20, 42, 48.

²Ibid., pp. 148, 154.

operations in Korea, to rebuild the general reserve in the United States and Europe, and to demobilize the reservists.

Secretary Marshall had proposed to release the involuntarily recalled reservists as soon as possible. In an October 1950 directive, he ordered that these men be released as soon as they could be replaced by trained men. Exigencies of the war did not permit this to occur in 1950. Congressional pressure to release these men increased as more men were recalled. In the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Congress required that all reservists who were veterans of World War II and had been involuntarily recalled be released between their twelfth and seventeenth month of service. All other reservists and guardsmen had to serve twenty-four months.¹

Assistant Secretary Rosenberg opposed this early release of reservists for she feared it would disrupt manpower planning. Once Congress passed the provision, however, she ordered the services to develop plans to release these men by late 1951. The Army released over 100,000 men by the time designated. Beginning in July, the Army gradually released these men. The individual's age, previous service, and family situation were the criterion for

¹House, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951, p. 22; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Recall and Release of Reservists, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1951, pp. 4-6. Hereafter cited as Recall and Release.

deciding when to release them.¹

In early 1951, the Defense Department decided to rotate men in Korea back to the United States as trained replacements became available for them. A point system with those who had served in combat units the longest, receiving the largest number of points was used to determine the time of rotation. Before the war ended in 1953, the army in Korea had been replaced three times as a result of the rotation policy. By December 1951, over 150,000 men had been returned home. Less than 300 men remained in Korea for their second winter.²

These pressures created another manpower shortage. The Army again turned to the National Guard divisions. The divisions that had been deployed overseas could not be touched so the recently federalized 31st and 47th Divisions were used to provide the needed men. This necessitated the recall of two more infantry divisions in early 1952, the 37th (Ohio) and 44th (Illinois). These units were also depleted to provide the necessary replacements for the rotation and release programs. The Army had no other sources of trained manpower.³

¹Recall and Release, p. 7; Reserve Components, p. 324.

²U.S., Office of Defense Mobilization, A Report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, 1954, p. 3; U.S. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1952, pp. 6-13.

³"Washington Report," The National Guardsman, September 1951, p. 4.

The effect of the recall policies on the individual reservist was devastating.

A Texas youth, as a typical case, emerged from the Army as a reserve sergeant four years ago. Since then, he has set up a prospering plumbing business and purchased a large amount of professional equipment with a GI loan from his bank. This month, however, he is being called back into uniform and, as his wife cannot run the business in his absence, he expects the bank to foreclose and repossess the equipment he must have to re-establish his business after his added tour of military service. He will be at least 38 by that time.

This man's competitor, ironically, is a youth just past draft age who has not seen military service and, not being a Reservist, is in no danger of being called into the Armed forces. He will be able to expand his business while the veteran is forced to close up shop and start over again in two years--or whenever he is released from service.¹

The plight of the reservists, such as this Texas plumber, soon reached members of Congress. The reservist and guardsman suffered other injustices as well. In many cases they were denied jobs, promotions, and in some cases, released from their jobs because of their vulnerability to recall. Recent ROTC graduates had a difficult time finding employment for the same reason. In addition many banks and insurance companies refused to do business with reservists.²

Inactive reservists did not understand why they were recalled and the members who were paid for training were not. Inactive reservists composed the majority of the men

¹"Reservists: The Forgotten Man," U.S. News and World Report, 20 October 1950, p. 17.

²Ibid.; U.S. National Security Training Commission 20th Century Minutemen, 1954, p. 9; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955, p. 1578.

recalled. In addition, because the Army had not maintained current records, addresses, or professional status of these men, many had very little time to put their personal affairs in order before reporting. In many cases, the Army did not utilize them in jobs related to their recent civilian employment.¹

The reservist's major complaint was that many men of induction age were deferred for reasons that did not apply to the reservists. The Selective Service System permitted deferments for farmers, students, and married men (even those with no children). Reservists in these categories were not deferred from recall. In many cases, recalled reservists had to be released shortly after they reported for duty because they were in critical occupations or had serious personal problems. These men still had to report for duty before they could have their status finally determined. The reservists and guardsmen felt they had been punished because they had decided to continue to serve their country while most who had not served were permitted to escape military service. Secretary Marshall made the plight of the reservist one of his top priorities after assuming office.²

Marshall published a directive concerning the welfare of the reservist in October 1950. He directed the

¹Recall and Release, p. 8.

²20th Century Minutemen, p. 9.

services to plan manpower requirements at least six months ahead of time and to notify the individuals concerned at least one month, and desirably four months, ahead of the reporting date. He further announced that the reservists would be released as soon as trained replacements were available. At the same time he directed the Civilian Components Policy Board to recommend permanent changes in the reserve system. The Board had to revise its legislative program completely because of the Korean War.¹

The Board reported its findings to Marshall in early 1951. He approved its recommendations and published the new regulations in April 1951. The regulations represented a departure from the former reserve system. The Board recommended the establishment of three categories of reservists: ready, standby, and retired. These regulations were to apply to the Air Force and Navy as well as the Army.

The Board designated the ready reserve as the force immediately ready for deployment. The entire National Guard and the M-day units of the Organized Reserves were part of this category. Members of the ready reserve could be recalled to service by a presidential declaration of an emergency.²

¹Proceedings, 1950, pp. 116-117; Facts on File, 1950, p. 340; "New Reserve Policies," Army Navy Journal, 28 October 1950, p. 247. The Reserve Officers Association concurred with the plan.

²"Defense Department Reserve Policies," Army Information Digest, June 1951, p. 59. Hereafter cited as Defense Policies.

The members of the standby reserve could be recalled only by a congressional declaration of war or a national emergency. These men would be recalled involuntarily to assist in the expansion of the armed forces not as part of the strike force. The standby reserves included the inactive element for those who could not actively participate in the reserve program. The members of the inactive reserve would only be recalled when there were no qualified men available in the ready or active standby categories.¹

The final category of reservists--the retired reserve--was for those who volunteered to be placed on the retired reserve list. They could be recalled only by a congressional declaration of war or national emergency.²

Marshall envisioned UMT as the foundation of this new system. Each UMT graduate would serve in the ready reserve before transferring to the standby reserve. This would insure an orderly flow of pretrained men into the reserve components.³

Marshall's policies also expanded his directive published the previous October. It reaffirmed the reservist's right to have thirty days to prepare for service. Marshall also expected the services to publish an anticipated priority

¹Ibid., p. 60.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

of units to be recalled.¹

Marshall's plan reaffirmed that the National Guard was still the first line of defense. The Guard would always be the first reserve units federalized in an emergency. If another partial mobilization occurred, however, the remaining units of the reserve components would be maintained intact in order to have a reserve force available for other emergencies. This guaranteed that the remaining units would not be used to provide individual replacements for the Regular Army as had occurred early in the Korean War. Once on active duty, however, there was no guarantee that the members of the reserve units would not be individually reassigned.²

Marshall attempted to satisfy other complaints of the reservists. He ordered the services to conduct a complete review of the records of reservists and to transfer to inactive status or eliminate those who would not be able to meet requirements for training and mobilization. He ordered physical examinations for all reservists every four years so that their qualification could be determined. Moreover, he desired that the pay and allowances of the reservists be the same as the members of the Regular Army. This had been a hindrance during the early phase of the mobilization; reservists with dependents did not have the

¹Ibid., p. 61.

²Ibid.

same allowances for dependents as did the Regular Army members, and this caused considerable hardship. Many reservists with dependents were deferred.¹

A major complaint of reservists concerned promotions. High-ranking reservists were not recalled while the Army quickly promoted members of the Regular Army. Moreover, the promotion boards selected a low percentage of the reserve officers who were on active duty. Marshall directed that all promotion boards have reservists on them to insure that reservists on active duty receive an equal chance for promotion.²

To protect reservists who voluntarily reported to active duty, Marshall directed that the services offer them contracts for a specific period of service. These contracts could be terminated at the request of the individual, but not by the services without monetary compensation for the member. This action guaranteed that the reservist would not be released because of fluctuations in the Army's strength.³

To insure that the reservists had a means of participating in defense policy formulation, Marshall desired congressional approval of various agencies that had recently been created. He changed the name of the Civilian

¹Ibid., pp. 61-64.

²Ibid.; Proceedings, 1951, p. 232; "The President's Page," The National Guardsman, November 1952, inside front page.

³Defense Policies, pp. 61-64.

Components Policy Board to the Reserve Forces Policy Board. In addition, he wanted Congress to authorize appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.¹ Marshall's program, which was conceived originally from the Gray Board recommendations, was the basis of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.

The Act of 1952 contained the major features of the Marshall reserve plan but did limit the ability of the President to recall members of the ready reserve. While the President retained authority to recall members of the ready reserve, Congress maintained its authority to determine the number of men he could recall for any emergency. The term of service for those recalled was increased to twenty-four months. It was envisioned that the ready reserve would be available for use in future partial mobilizations like Korea. Congress could, however, recall members of the ready reserve for the duration of an emergency plus six months by a declaration of an emergency.²

The Armed Forces Reserve Act specified that the total term of service for individuals enlisting or inducted into the armed forces would be eight years. The act provided for lesser terms of service for those who had joined the

¹Ibid., p. 59.

²U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, National Reserve Plan. H. R. 5297, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1955, pp. 9-10. Hereafter cited as National Reserve Plan.

Army between the Selective Service Act of 1948 and the effective date of the Reserve Act. Individuals had to spend five years in the regular or ready reserve forces before they qualified for the standby reserve. Veterans of World War II and the Korean War and those with over eight years in the reserve components since 1945 were eligible for transfer to the standby reserve immediately. All transfers were to be completed by January 1953.¹

The Armed Forces Reserve Act was only half of the permanent solution Secretary Marshall wanted. The other half of the new reserve plan was Universal Military Training. UMT and the Armed Forces Reserve Act were both initially considered by Congress in early 1951. Congress approved the Universal Military Training and Service Act in June 1951. This act extended selective service for two more years and the obligation of reservists for twenty-four instead of the twenty-one months previously authorized by Congress. Congress also authorized President Truman to extend Regular Army enlistments for another year. Congress approved UMT in principle only but appointed a commission, known as the National Security Training Commission, to recommend how to implement the concept of UMT.²

¹Proceedings, 1951, p. 56; U.S. Department of Defense, "Your Reserve Obligation," Armed Forces Talk #421, pp. 8-13. The National Guard Association opposed the plan because it did not force men to join the Guard's units.

²20th Century Minutemen, p. 133; Galloway, pp. 472-473.

The Universal Military Training and Service Act did require additional service in the reserves for those inducted under the act. The term of induction was increased to two years in the Regular Army and six years afterward in the reserves. Secretary Marshall had requested that the time in the regular forces be extended to twenty-seven months to lessen personnel turnover. In addition, the act lowered the minimum age for induction from 19 to 18½ years old. Secretary Marshall and Assistant Secretary Rosenberg believed this slip was necessary if the Army was to have enough men available for induction. Married men without children also lost their deferment because of this act. The act required that all servicemen be given four months of basic training before they were sent overseas.¹

The National Guard Association did not support the idea of inducting younger men since it would take away their prime recruiting source. The Guard did win a partial victory by retaining the deferment for those men who joined the Guard before 18½ and remained active in the Guard during their tour of duty.²

¹Galloway, pp. 472-473; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 149. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Universal Military Training and Service Act, S. 1, Senate Report #117, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, pp. 34-35.

²Galloway, pp. 472-473; "Washington Report," The National Guardsman, April 1951, p. 17; "Washington Report," The National Guardsman, March 1951, p. 14.

The National Security Training Commission released its first report in 1953. In this report the Commission declared that the reserve system was inequitable. Veterans still composed the majority of the members of the reserve components. At the same time there was no incentive for reservists to join active units. Only one-third of all reservists had joined units to complete their six-year obligation. For this reason the Commission recommended that UMT be fully implemented. The Commission believed that the trainee should participate in formal military training for six months and then be required to serve in the reserves for seven and a half years. These men should always be recalled before the veterans in the reserves. The Commission concluded that this was the only manner that an equitable reserve system could be formulated.¹

Later studies by the National Security Training Commission and other federal agencies produced the National Reserve Plan which was presented to Congress by President Eisenhower in November 1954. Congress approved this plan in 1955 as an amendment to the Armed Forces Reserve Act. The amendment doubled the size of the ready reserve to 2.9 million men. The President could now recall one million men for an emergency on his own authority.²

The 1952 Reserve Act had required men to serve in

¹Galloway, pp. 474-476.

²Office of Defense Mobilization, Report, pp. iii-vii.

the ready reserve but did not require them to join units or actively participate in training. By 1955 the ready reserve had exceeded its authorized limit, but less than 700,000 men were in paid training positions. Once again most of the reservists were in an inactive status. The standby reserve, composed of less than 200,000 men, most of whom were in the inactive reserve, proved that a reliable mobilization base had not been established.¹

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 decreased the total service obligation to six years. At the same time the Act required all ready reservists to participate in forty-eight drills and a fifteen-day summer camp or a thirty-day active duty training period annually. The men who participated in the units would be transferred to the standby reserve more rapidly. In addition, the act required that the Secretary of Defense make annual reviews of all reserve records and transfer into other categories those individuals who could no longer participate in active training because of physical condition, hardship, or occupation.²

Congress in 1955 also extended the Selective Service Act for four more years. The revised Selective Service Act permitted direct enlistments into the Organized Reserves for men who agreed to participate in active duty

¹Ibid., pp. 14-15; Galloway, pp. 476-478.

²Galloway, pp. 479-481; National Reserve Plan, p. 11.

basic training first. This was an incentive for those who wished to avoid being inducted by serving their obligation in the reserves. UMT, although recommended by the National Security Training Commission, failed to pass Congress again.¹

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1955 failed to require the pretraining of recruits for the National Guard. This provision had originally been included in the Act but had been eliminated because of congressional efforts to integrate all Guard units.² The Act of 1955 dealt only with the Organized Reserves.

The Army in 1957 issued a directive requiring all new guardsmen to participate in six months active duty basic training before they reported to their units. The National Guard Association opposed the directive because it had not received congressional approval. Congressman Overton Brooks of the House Armed Services Committee subsequently proposed a compromise that the Army and the National Guard Association approved. The Guard agreed to the pretraining of new guard members while the Army agreed to maintain the Guard at a minimum strength of 400,000 men and permit the Guard to recruit a share of the active duty servicemen being discharged into the ready reserve. An orderly flow of pretrained men into both reserve components

¹Galloway, pp. 480-482.

²Ibid., pp. 482-485.

had been established.¹

The National Security Training Commission issued its final report in 1957. The Commission's goals in 1953 had been to replace the veterans in the reserve forces by nonveterans and to require all members of the reserve forces to have basic training on active duty before returning to their units. Four years later, the Commission believed that these objectives had been achieved and that the Commission could therefore be abolished. Universal Military Training was not the basis of the new reserve system; selective service was the basis of the system. The inductees and volunteer enlistees had a double obligation--active duty service followed by service in the reserves. It was not the solution Secretary Marshall had desired, but it insured that the reserve forces would continually be filled by trained replacements. The combination of the Armed Forces Reserve Act and the Selective Service Act had at last created a trained responsive reserve force.

¹U.S. National Security Training Commission, Final Report to the Congress, 1957, pp. 2-3; 20th Century Minutemen, pp. 124-129.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: AN UNCERTAIN SITUATION

The inflexible mobilization doctrine developed by the Army after World War II virtually determined the mobilization policies followed during the Korean War. The Korean War was the Army's first partial mobilization. Mobilization plans prepared before that war broke out were for a total war. The Army envisioned another situation like World War II, not a limited war.

That same mobilization doctrine was part of the general military and foreign policies of the United States. By 1945 the United States had emerged as one of the major powers, only four years after Pearl Harbor forced it to abandon its traditional isolationism. The United States had little experience in this situation. The nation no longer had the advantages of time, allies, and geographic position to develop the military forces to fight a war. America was now in the front lines.

The experience of World War II and the new diplomatic situation of 1945 forced the nation to make changes in the diplomatic decision-making process. The armed forces were unified, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was created to develop military plans. The National Security Council also was organized to coordinate American military-diplomatic policies. These agencies had just been organized and were

in the process of modification when the Korean War started. The United States lacked a firm military and foreign policy partly because of the lack of experience in the agencies developed to formulate this policy. These policies had to be developed before the mobilization policy to support them.

America traditionally returns to domestic concerns after its wars. World War II was no exception as the demobilization of the Army after the war demonstrated. Domestic pressures played a major role in the development of military policy after 1945. The nation demanded demobilization of the armed forces, and it wanted smaller defense budgets. As budgets shrank, the competition for money among the services intensified. Initially, the Defense Department was unable to resolve this problem. The Army, with responsibility for the occupation of Europe and Japan and logistical support of the Air Force, funded items that did not directly enhance readiness. During the austere years funds for the training of men needed for mobilization were cut quickly so that the other services could procure expensive equipment.

The military strategy envisioned in 1945 was essentially an interpretation of the experiences of World War II. The Air Force was perceived as the first line of defense. The Navy, traditionally the first line of defense, fought the change in its status. The strategic controversy centered on these two services and their ability to conduct preemptive or retaliatory strikes on enemy nations. The

Army was a secondary force in this strategy. The regular units were to be used immediately to provide security for the other services, and the mobilization base units were to be used only if the initial strikes did not end the war. Only in the latter case would a land war be necessary.

After World War II the Army underwent radical changes in its organization. The National Guard was to be three times its prewar size and would have a major function in the first days of a future war. The Organized Reserves would have units for the first time, and many of these units would be organized like the Guard. The Regular Army would contain only those units needed for peacetime service. These plans assumed that Universal Military Training would be instituted in the United States for the first time.

The three components of the Army were in competition with each other for men and money. The National Guard had an advantage over the other components because of the National Guard Association. The Association leaders occupied a dual role as members of the military and political lobbyists. They could use their influence to stop policies still in the developmental stage. The Guard had a traditional role in the defense structure, and congressional connections helped it keep this position. The Organized Reserve Corps, however, did not have as effective a congressional lobbying force in the Reserve Officers Association.

The Army was able to make major changes in the reserve forces when representatives of the reserves were

involved in the process. The Gray Board, which did not have this representation, was not able to secure acceptance of its primary recommendation--unification of the two reserve forces. The Byrnes Committee, however, did have this representation and was able to decrease the size of the two reserve components without political complications. The Guard Association approved the Byrnes Committee's recommendations since General Walsh was a member of the Committee.

The "Eighteen Division" plan was a realistic one. General Bradley tied this plan to the Air Force strategy of forward bases. Bradley argued that the forward bases needed ground defense and eighteen divisions was the minimum necessary to protect these bases. This was an accurate projection; in June 1951 the Army had eighteen active divisions. The eighteen division force would have eased many of the problems of the Korean mobilization.

By June 1950 the United States was relying on allies throughout the world to provide ground forces. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was originally organized with the Western European nations supplying ground forces while the United States provided strategic forces. An eighteen division active army could not be justified under these conditions.

Universal Military Training, the basis of the early mobilization plans, was not politically or economically feasible in the postwar era. President Truman was unwilling to add the cost of Universal Military Training to the limited

military budgets and could not justify this training as the basis of a military strategy predicated on airpower.

The Army had little choice in its mobilization policies during the Korean War. The principal need was for trained men to rebuild the depleted units. Initially the Regular Army and Organized Reserves provided these men. The burden of mobilization fell most heavily on the veterans of World War II. The National Guard divisions could not be ready for deployment for nine months, and the Army needed at least six months to train the recruits inducted by the Selective Service System.¹

The Army had to rely on veterans and regulars until early 1951 when new replacements would be available. The mobilization of veterans limited the size of selective service calls because the training cadre, equipment, and installations needed to train these men were not available. The Army's short-term mobilization limited the long-term solution.

By early 1951 Europe--not Korea--was America's vital interest. For this reason the number of men available for deployment to the Far East was limited as the Army attempted to rebuild the units of the general reserve.

¹Over 80 percent of the members of the Organized Reserve Corps mobilized during the first year of Korea (162,000 officers and men) were not members of units. U.S. Department of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 1951, p. 106.

Selective service was the principal mobilization method. By June 1951 the Army had increased to 1.5 million men from the 590,000 of the year before. Only 20 percent of Army's strength was from the reserve components in June 1951, and these men were starting to be released from active duty.¹

Mobilization planners during Korea were not able to develop long-range policies. The varying lengths of service for reservists established by Congress and the pressure of rotation created a changing manpower situation. The Army could not project its manpower needs, and the reservists suffered as a result. There was little the Army could do to change this situation and still meet its commitments. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 established categories of recall to prevent a recurrence of this situation.

Army mobilization planners worked with a fluctuating situation during the post-World War II and Korean War era. Under these circumstances the development of a flexible mobilization doctrine was nearly impossible to achieve. The Army needed a force that could, in the words of General Maxwell Taylor

react across the entire spectrum of possible challenges, for coping with anything from general war to infiltration

¹U.S., Office of Secretary of Defense, Director for Statistical Services, Selected Manpower Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 24, 86.

and aggressions . . . [since it is] just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. . . .¹

In order to do this the Army had to have contingency plans to cover various possible situations, not just a total war. The Army also needed trained units and a pool of trained men. So rapidly did the political, diplomatic, and military policies change from 1945 to 1951 that this organized force could not be created. A mobilization scheme is the end, not the beginning of a strategic decision-making process which involves many political and strategic systems. Forced to mobilize before the strategic and political policies had been fully developed, the Army could only meet the manpower needs of the Korean War at a great cost to the reserve system.

¹Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 6-7.

SOURCES

SOURCES

I. Special Tools

Any study of the United States Army reserve components should begin with Eilene Galloway's History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces 1775-1957.

(Prepared for Subcommittee #1, House Armed Services Committee) Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1957.

Although dated, this work has an extensive bibliography of government documents and publications. Galloway is concerned primarily with legislative aspects of reserve policy.

Jim Dan Hill's The Minute Man in Peace and War. Harrisburg: Stackpole Publishing Company, 1964, examines the operational aspects of the reserve policy. Hill, a Guard Major General, has a somewhat bias viewpoint, but his book has detailed bibliographies after each chapter.

The Department of the Army Library has published several bibliographies concerning the reserve components.

Its Military Manpower Policy: A Bibliographic Survey.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965, has an extensive topical list of sources. The Library also has issued separate bibliographies concerning the National Guard and Organized Reserves, Civilian in Peace, Soldiers in War, A Bibliographic Survey of the Army and National Guard.

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967, and Strength in Reserve: A Bibliographic Survey of the United States Army Reserve. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968.

More recently, Richard Burt, ed. Congressional Hearings on American Defense Policy 1947-1971. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974 has listed all the congressional hearings by year and committee. He summarizes the testimony of key witnesses for each hearing. Martin Anderson, ed. Conscription: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1976 provides an extensive listing of government documents and secondary sources concerning selective service. An extensive bibliography of American military and foreign policy may be found in Arthur D. Larson's National Security Affairs: A Guide to Information Sources. Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1973 and John Greenwood's American Defense Policy Since 1945: A Preliminary Bibliography. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973. Robin Higham, ed. Guide to the Sources of United States Military History. Hamden: Archon, 1975 provides a bibliographic essay on the post-World War II policies of the

Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. Carroll H. Blanchard's Korean War Bibliography and Maps of Korea. Albany: Korean Conflict Research Foundation, 1964 is now dated but has an extensive listing of documents, articles, and books printed before 1963.

II. Primary Sources

A. U.S. Government Documents and Publications

U.S. Armed Forces Information School. The Army Almanac. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950. Source of basic facts.

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations. Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1947. Hearings. 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1947. Hearings. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1948. Hearings. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. Military Establishment Bill, 1948. House Report 495, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. Military Functions, National Military Establishment Bill for 1949. Hearings. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. National Military Establishment, Military Function Appropriations Bill 1949. H.R. 6771. House Report 2135, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1950. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. National Military Establishment Appropriation Bill 1950. H.R. 4146. House Report 417, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

_____. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.

- _____ . House. Committee on Appropriations. The Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____ . House. Committee on Appropriations. Second Supplemental Appropriations Bill for 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____ . House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1952. Hearings before a subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Universal Military Training. Hearings before subcommittee #2 on H.R. 4121. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Selective Service. Hearings on H.R. 6274, H.R. 6401. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.
- _____ . House. Special Subcommittee on Reserve Components Hearings on Matters Affecting Civilian Components of the Armed Forces. Committee Serial 129. 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
- _____ . House. Selective Service Act Extension. Hearings on H.R. 6826. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 9177 to Authorize the President to Extend Enlistments in the Armed Forces of the United States. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Universal Military Training. Hearings on H.R. 1752. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Recall and Release of Reservists. First Interim Report of the Special Subcommittee on Civilian Components. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. Reserve Components. Hearings before subcommittee #1 on H.R. 4860. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1951. First congressional hearings on Armed Forces Reserve Act.
- _____ . House. Armed Services Committee. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951. House Report 1066 concerning H.R. 5426. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951. Contains a brief legislative history of the reserve forces.

- _____. House. Armed Services Committee. Universal Military Training. Hearings on H.R. 5904. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.
- _____. House. Armed Services Committee. Hearings on H.R. 5472 to Amend Universal Military Training and Service Act, as Amended by subcommittee #1. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.
- _____. House. Armed Services Committee. National Reserve Plan. House Report 457 on H.R. 5297. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
- _____. House. Armed Services Committee. National Reserve Plan. Hearings before subcommittee #1 on H.R. 2967. 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 1955.
- _____. House. Armed Services Committee. Review of the Reserve Program. Hearings before subcommittee #1. 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1957.
- _____. House. Committee on Military Affairs. Hearings on Demobilization of the Army. 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1946.
- _____. House. Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy. Universal Military Training. Hearings. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1948. Hearings on H.R. 3678 before a subcommittee. 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Military Functions Appropriation Bill for 1949. Hearings on H.R. 6771 before a subcommittee. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1951. Hearings before a subcommittee. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training. Hearings. 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training. Hearings on S. 4062. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.

- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. The Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall to be Secretary of Defense. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Nomination of Anna M. Rosenberg to be Assistant Secretary of Defense. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. To Extend Enlistments in the Armed Forces. Hearings on S. 3937. 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Universal Training and Service Act. Senate Report 117. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. Hearings on S. 1 by the Preparedness Subcommittee. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Armed Forces Reserve Act. Hearings on H.R. 5426. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. Senate Report 1795. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Senate Report 91 by the subcommittee on preparedness. 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Status of Reserve and National Guard Forces of the Armed Services. Second report of the subcommittee on preparedness. 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1954.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in that Area. 5 parts, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area. Hearings on Senate Resolution 8. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.

- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations. Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference. Prepared by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951.
 - _____. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The United States and the Korean Problem, Documents 1943-1953, Presented by Senator Alexander Wiley. Senate Document 74. 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1953.
 - _____. Senate. Subcommittee on Military Affairs. Hearings on S. 1355; Demobilization of the Armed Forces. 3 parts. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.
 - _____. Senate. The Constitution of the United States of America. Senate Document 170, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1953. Annotated edition of the Constitution.
- U.S. Department of the Army. National Guard Bureau. Annual Reports of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 1946-1957. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946-1957. Excellent source of legal, logistical, and operational aspects of the National Guard.
- _____. Department of the Army Policies Pertaining to the Reserve Components of the Army. DA PAM 135-1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953. Explanation of Department of the Army implementation of Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952.
 - _____. The Role of the Reserve in the Total Army. DA PAM 140-7. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977. Good historical data on the Organized Reserves.
- U.S. Department of Defense. First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. Sometimes listed under the National Military Establishment, the name for the Department of Defense before 1949.
- _____. Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1949-1953. Washington: Government Printing Office, published semiannually. Extensive data on legal, logistical, and operational aspects of the military. Also contains the semiannual report of the Secretary of the Army.
 - _____. Office of Secretary of Defense, Director for Statistical Services. Selected Manpower Statistics. Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1967. Historical data on Selective Service, the Regular Army, and the Reserve Components.

_____. "Our Stand in Korea," Armed Forces Talk #334.
Washington: Department of Defense, 1950.

_____. "The New Draft Law and You," Armed Forces Talk #381. Washington: Department of Defense, 1951.

U.S. Department of State. United States Policy in the Korean Crisis. Department of State Publication 3922.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.
Collection of documents concerning the decision to intervene in Korea.

_____. United States Policy on the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951. Department of State Publication 4263. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.

_____. American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957. Extensive collection of documents pertinent to the Korean conflict.

_____. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976.
Contains many documents not found in other sources.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974.
Official definitions.

Marshall, George C. General of the Army. Demobilization of the Army. Remarks by George C. Marshall. Senate Document 90, 79th Cong, 1st Sess., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945. Outline of the problems of demobilization.

U.S. National Security Training Commission. Universal Military Training. 1st Report to Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. The Commission's recommendation in favor of Universal Military Training.

_____. 20th Century Minutemen. Report to the President. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954.
Plan for the post-Korea reserve structure.

_____. Annual Report to the Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956.

_____. Final Report to the Congress. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. Report on the success of the new reserve legislation.

U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization. A Report to the President by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, January 6, 1954. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. Outlines the National Reserve Plan.

President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training. A Program for National Security. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. The report of Dr. Karl T. Compton on the need for Universal Military Training as part of national security.

Reserve Forces for National Security. Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. The report of Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray on the status on the reserve component and the need to merge the National Guard and Organized Reserves.

U.S. Selective Service System. Report of the Director 1947-1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950.

_____. Selective Service Under the 1948 Act 24 July 1948-9 July 1950. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.

_____. Selective Service Under the 1948 Act Extended July 9, 1950-June 19, 1951. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953.

_____. Annual Report of the Director of Selective Service, Fiscal Year 1951. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952.

Truman, Harry S. "A Strong Defense to Achieve Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin. XXVI (2 June 1952), 847-850.

U.S. War Department. Biennial Report, Chief of Staff United Army, 1939-1945. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941-1945. General Marshall's reports on the mobilization for World War II, conduct of the war, and plans for the postwar military structure.

_____. Public Relations Division. A Plan for Universal Military Training. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946. Outlines the War Department plan.

_____. Final Report of the Chief of Staff United States Army to the Secretary of the Army. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948. General Eisenhower's report on his term as Chief of Staff.

_____. Army Information Branch. "Our Reorganized Army," Army Talk #152. Washington: Department of the Army, 1946.

_____. Army Information Branch. "Our National Guard," Army Talk #154. Washington: Department of the Army, 1946.

_____. Army Information Branch. "Universal Military Training," Army Talk #155. Washington: Department of the Army, 1946.

_____. Army Information Branch. "The Organized Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps," Army Talk #158. Washington: Department of the Army, 1947.

B. Memoirs

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: Norton, 1969. Essential source for understanding the foreign and military policy decisions during the Truman Administration.

_____. The Korean War. New York: Norton, 1971. Excerpts from Present at the Creation concerning the Korean War.

Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. New York: Harper, 1954. Concentrates on the period of negotiations with the North Koreans and the Communist Chinese.

Ridgway, Matthew B. Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway. New York: Harper, 1956. Several references to the decisions of the Joint Chiefs during the first six months of the Korean War.

_____. The Korean War. Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1967. A deeper analysis of the war and his duty with 8th Army and the Far East Command than his memoirs.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Vol. 1: Year of Decision. New York: Doubleday, 1955. Refers to his efforts to rebuild the reserve forces.

_____. Memoirs. Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope. New York: Doubleday, 1956. Deals with the Korean War.

C. Books

Berstein, Barton J., and Matusow, Alen J., ed. The Truman Administration: A Documentary History. New York: Harper, 1966. Excellent selection of documents dealing with the cold war and the Korean War.

Lapica, Ray, ed. Facts on File Yearbook. 1950-1951 (vols. 10-11) New York: Facts on File Inc., 1951-1952. Excellent source for basic data.

Millis, Walter, ed. The Forrestal Diaries. New York: Viking Press, 1951. Valuable reference on unification and the cold war.

National Guard Association of the United States. Official Proceedings of the National-Guard Association of the United States. 1946-1941. Washington: National Guard Association of the United States, 1946-1951. The record of the yearly National Guard Association conventions. Good source for the Association's position on various issues.

_____. The Nation's National Guard. Washington: National Guard Association of the United States, 1954. Reprint of several speeches by General Walsh.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., and Burns, Roger, ed. Congress Investigates 1792-1974. New York: Chelsea House, 1975. Excerpts of the MacArthur hearings.

Walker, Robert A., ed. America's Manpower Crisis: The Report of the Institute on Manpower Utilization and Government Personnel. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1952. Contains a speech by Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson on the Army's manpower policies.

Weigley, Russell F., ed. The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969. Contains a reprint of War Department Circular 347.

D. Newspapers and Magazines

Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, June 1950-July 1951.

Association of the U.S. Army. United States Army Combat Forces Journal, August 1950-July 1953.

The Infantry Association. Infantry Journal, January 1945-August 1950. Combined with the Artillery Journal in August 1950 to form the United States Army Combat Forces Journal.

National Guard Association of the United States. The National Guardsman, March 1947-December 1952.

U.S. Department of the Army. Command and General Staff College. Military Review, June 1944-April 1953.

U.S. Department of the Army. Director of Information. Army Information Digest, May 1946-December 1952.

E. Newspaper and Magazine Articles

The best bibliography for periodical articles is the U.S. Air University, Air University Index of Military Periodicals. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air University, published quarterly. The Three Year Cumulation 1949-1952 was used for this study.

Baldwin, Hanson W. "Army Reserve Warning," New York Times 96 (24 March 1947):8. Outlines the problems with the Organized Reserves.

_____. "Guard and Reserve Vie," New York Times 96 (27 March 1947):6. Discussion of the competitive aspects of the two reserve components.

_____. "Guard Obstacles Told," New York Times 96 (4 April 1947):16. Argues that the current reserve structure is obsolete.

Bradley, Omar N. "Creating a Sound Military Force," Military Review 29 (May 1949):3-7. Bradley argues for the need for balanced military forces.

_____. "'Red Atom Day' and American Plans," Infantry Journal 60 (December 1949):19. Explanation of the effects of Russian nuclear weapons on American military strategy.

_____. "Long-Range Strategy for a Lasting Peace," United States Army Combat Forces Journal 2 (May 1952):10-11. Explanation of the long-range military policy as a result of the Korean War.

_____. "The Path Ahead," Army Information Digest 6 (October 1950):24-25. Explanation of the plans to rebuild the Regular Army forces as a result of the deployments to Korea.

. "U.S. Military Policy 1950," United States Combat Forces Journal 1 (October 1950):5-11. Bradley argues that Korea has forced a shift in American foreign policy from containing to contesting communism.

"Building Our Military Manpower," Army Information Digest 6 (September 1950):2-8. Summary of mobilization plans during the first three months of the war.

Collins, J. Lawton. "New Approaches to World Peace," Army Information Digest 7 (January 1951):3-9. Claims that the Korean War is not emblematic of future warfare.

Cramer, Kenneth F. "The National Guard in the Post-War Military Establishment," Military Review 28 (June 1948):3-9. Explanation of the new Guard structure and the problems confronting it.

Cress, James B. "The New CRC Program," Army Information Digest 5 (May 1950):11-16. Detailed explanation of the Army's new plan.

"Defense Department Reserve Policies," Army Information Digest 6 (June 1951):58-64. Reprint of April 1951 policies.

Edmonds, James E. "It's Up to Congress," The National Guardsman 3 (January 1949):8-10. History of the Guard-Regular Army feud and a call for the end of it.

Greene, Paul C. "Let's Quit Squabbling," Infantry Journal 59 (January 1948):31-33. Argues that the Organized Reserves will only be effective if the Regular Army takes a large interest in their training and organization.

Johnson, Earl D. "Rotation," The National Guardsman 6 (March 1952):2-4. Explains the Army's rotation policy and claims that the benefits of rotation outweigh the problems created.

Johnson, Louis. "Strengthening the Defense Team," Army Information Digest 3 (October 1949):3-7. Claims that the military force will be stronger with the planned budget cuts.

"Legislation for National Security," Army Information Digest 5 (December 1950):60-64. Summary of manpower laws as a result of the Korean War.

Marshall, George C. "Prepare for 10 Years of Tension," US News and World Report 30 (13 April 1951):24-31. Interview with Marshall. He states that the current crisis will last a long time and UMT is the way to prepare for the situation.

McQuiston, Irving M. "Reserve Forces for Defense," Army Information Digest 6 (April 1951):44-47. Author was a member of the Civilian Components Policy Board and explains the functioning of the Board.

Moravac, Charles J. "Allentown Schools Train Reservists," Army Information Digest 5 (August 1950):55-58. Description of the operation of the first reserve training school.

Mulkey, Steve W. "Teamwork Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Army Information Digest 5 (July 1950):45-51. Explains the organization and operation of the Joint Staff.

"M-Day--The Reality," The National Guardsman 5 (February 1951): 2. Articles by commanders of four guard units federalized in September 1950 concerning the problems they confronted during the mobilization.

"No Other Choice," The National Guardsman 5 (November 1951):2. Department of the Army's explanation for the levies on guard units to provide replacements for Korea.

"Preparedness 1950 vs 1941," US News and World Report 29 (18 August 1950):22-23. Comparison of the status of the Army on the eve of World War II and the Korean War.

"Reserve Forces Act of 1955," Army Information Digest 11 (February 1956):1-72. Entire issue devoted to the implications of the Act.

"Reservists: The Forgotten Men," US News and World Report 29 (20 October 1950):15-17. Examples of the effects of the mobilization on members of the reserve forces.

Rickey, T. G. "What Lies Ahead," The National Guardsman 4 (October 1950):18-21. Explanation of the training period for federalized guard units.

"Third of Reservists Face Call," US News and World Report 30 (9 February 1951):14-15. Description of the problems facing the reservists as a result of the mobilization.

Walsh, Ellard A. "A Grab for Power," The National Guardsman 2 (January 1948):4-5. Argues that two reserve forces are more economical than one.

_____. "We'll Fight Them at Every Turn," The National Guardsman 2 (September 1948):8-9. Walsh's response to the Gray Board recommendations.

III. Secondary Sources

A. U.S. Government Documents and Publications

Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950). Part of the series United States Army in the Korean War. Washington: Government Printing Office. Outstanding tactical study of the first six months of the Korean War.

Donnelly, Charles H. United States Defense Policies Since World War II. House document 100, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957. Traces the evolution of American military policy 1945-1956.

Galloway, Eilene. A Brief History of the United States Military Policy on Reserve Forces. Prepared for House Armed Services Committee. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952. Legislative and organizational history of the reserve forces.

Giusti, Ernest H. Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951. Washington: Historical Section, G-3 Division, HQ US Marine Corps, 1951. Description of the mobilization of the Marines for Korea.

Hewes, James F. From Root to McNamara. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975. Organizational history of the Department of the Army 1900-1963.

Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953. Part of Army Historical Series. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966. History of Army Logistics. Good for background.

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G. History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945. DA PAM 20-212. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955. Invaluable source for background information on legal, logistical, and operational aspects of American mobilizations.

Lerwill, Leonard L. The Personnel Replacement System in the US Army. DA PAM 20-211. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. History of Army replacement policies, 1775-1947.

Matloff, Maurice, ed. American Military History. Part of Army Historical Series. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973. Excellent general history.

Schabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year. Part of series United States Army in the Korean War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1972. Invaluable source on policy development and manpower planning by the Joint Chiefs during the first year of the war. Based on documents that are still classified.

Sparrow, John C. History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army. DA PAM 20-210. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952. Emphasis of study is on the demobilization of the Army following World War II.

U.S. 8th Army. The First Ten Years. No publisher listed, 1954. Unofficial history of the 8th Army 1944-1954.

B. Books

Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964. Political history of the Korean War.

Bernardo, C. Joseph, and Bacon, Eugene H. American Military Policy. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. History of military policy 1775-1953.

Borklund, Carl W. Men of the Pentagon, From Forrestal to McNamara. New York: Praeger, 1966. Biographies of the Secretaries of Defense until 1966.

_____. The Department of Defense. New York: Praeger, 1968. Organizational history of the Defense Department.

Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Lively discussion of the controversies of the war.

Derthick, Martha. The National Guard in Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Study of the National Guard Association as a political lobbying force.

- Dupuy, Richard Ernest. The National Guard: A Compact History. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1971. Short general history.
- Fehrenback, T. R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Argues for a better prepared military force in peacetime.
- Fitzpatrick, Edward A. Universal Military Training. New York: McGraw Hill, 1945. Arguments in favor of UMT as part of the postwar structure.
- Gavin, James M. War and Peace in the Space Age. New York: Harper, 1958. Sees the problems in Korea as a result of a lack of flexibility in the military structure. He outlines a program to correct this.
- Gerhardt, James M. The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945-1970. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1971. Concerns the political fights over the draft in the post-World War II era.
- Hammond, Paul Y. Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. Excellent source for organization history of the Defense Department after World War II.
- Heller, Francis H., ed. The Korean War: A 25 Year Perspective. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977. Reprint of a conference at the Truman Library by participants and observers of the Korean War on its meaning.
- Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Analysis of the relationship between military, domestic, and foreign policy. Section on the Cold War and Korea is brief.
- Huzar, Elias. The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Military Appropriations, 1933-1950. Ithica: Cornell University, 1950. Good background information on the appropriations process.
- Kolodziej, Edward A. The Uncommon Defense and Congress 1945-1963. Columbus: Ohio State Press, 1966. Outlines the role of Congress in defense policy. Good background on the post-World War II period.
- Korb, Lawrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976. Organizational history of the Joint Chiefs and comparison of the biographies of the members.

Levantrosser, William F. Congress and the Citizen-Soldier: Legislative Policy-Making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve. Columbus: Ohio State University, 1967. Analysis of principal laws affecting the reserve forces since 1945. Excellent discussion of the Armed Forces Reserve Acts of 1952 and 1955 and the role of the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association in their passage.

May, Ernest R. "Lessons" of the Past. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. Focuses on the use of historical analogy in policy decisions. Excellent chapter on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War.

Palmer, John McA. America in Arms. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. History of American policy toward reserve forces since colonial times. Argues that George Washington's real sentiments toward the reserve forces was for a "well organized" militia.

Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall. Vol. 3. Organizer of Victory 1943-1945. New York: Viking, 1973. References to Marshall's relationship with Palmer.

Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martins, 1964. Best one volume history of the Korean War.

Schilling, Warner R., Paul Y. Hamond, and Glenn H. Snyder. Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets. New York: Columbia University, 1962. Hammond's chapter on NSC-68 and Schilling's chapter on the FY 1950 budget were both very helpful.

Riker, William H. Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957. A study in reserve policy of the United States as a part of federalism.

Ropp, Theodore. War in the Modern World. New York: Collier Books, 1962. Analyzes the post-World War II era in its political, economical, social, and technological aspects.

Sherry, Michael S. Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense 1941-1945. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Study of the Special Plans Division and its attempts to formulate a postwar Army structure.

Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Praeger, 1960. Good general account of foreign policy during the Cold War.

Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1959. Taylor states that the military forces before Korea were structured for only a total war and the concept of "flexible response" is necessary to meet any future challenge.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Excellent general history of the Army.

C. Articles and Separate Chapters

Bell, James A. "Defense Secretary Louis Johnson," American Mercury 70 (June 1950):643-653. Detailed biography of Johnson.

Brayton, Abbott A. "American Reserve Policies Since World War II," Military Affairs 36 (December 1972):139-144. Brief overview of reserve policies.

Donnelly, Charles H. "Evolution of United States Military Strategic Thought," Military Review 39 (October 1959): 12-24. Analysis of military thought throughout American history.

Hoare, Wilbur. "Truman (1945-1953)." Contained in The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief. Pp. 70-100. Ernest May, ed. New York: Braziller, 1960. Examines Truman's actions during the Korean War.

Huntington, Samuel P. "Men at Arms? The Regrettable Story of our Military Manpower," Columbia University Forum 2 (Spring 1959):42-47. Argues that the money spent on reserve forces after the Korean War was wasted since the reserves have no place in nuclear war.

"The Reserves of the Armed Forces: A Historical Symposium," Military Affairs 17 (Spring 1953):1-36. Series of papers dealing with the historical and contemporary problems of the reserve forces.

Wiltz, John E. "The MacArthur Hearings of 1951: The Secret Testimony," Military Affairs 39 (December 1975):167-173. Examination of the secret portions of the MacArthur hearings. Wiltz argues that the American people would have better understood the war and MacArthur's relief had the full transcript of the hearings been released in 1951.

D. Unpublished Works

Flint, Roy K. The Tragic Flaw: MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs, and the Korean War. Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1976. Detailed study of the relationship between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur during the first nine months of the war. Excellent summary of the manpower mobilization for the war.